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THE JEWISH LAW FIRM: PAST AND PRESENT 
 




       The rise and growth of large Jewish law firms in New York City during the second 
half of the twentieth century is nothing short of an astounding success story. 2 As late as 
1950, there was not a single large Jewish law firm in town. By the mid-1960s, six of the 
largest twenty law firms were Jewish, and by 1980, four of the largest ten law firms were 
Jewish firms.3 Moreover, the accomplishment of these Jewish firms is especially striking 
because, while the traditional large White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (“WASP”) law firms 
also grew at a fast rate during this period, the Jewish firms grew twice as fast, and they 
did so in spite of explicit discrimination.  
       What happened? This chapter studies the rise and growth of large New York City 
Jewish law firms. It does so on the basis of the public record, with respect to both the law 
firms themselves and trends in the legal profession generally, and through more than 
twenty in-depth interviews with lawyers who either founded and practiced at these 
successful Jewish firms, attempted and failed to establish such firms, or were in a 
position to join these firms but decided instead to join WASP firms.4  
 
One generic5 explanation is that Jewish law firms rose as the result of changes in 
                                                 
1
 Charles W. Delaney Jr. Professor of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law; B.A., Tel-Aviv 
University; L.L.B., Tel-Aviv University; L.L.M., Harvard Law School (waived); S.J.D., Harvard Law 
School. This chapter is based on an article previously published in Eli Wald, “The Rise of the Jewish Law 
Firm or Is the Jewish Law Firm Generic?” UMKC Law Review 76 (2008): 885–938. 
2
 See Part III.A below for a defin ition of a Jewish law firm.  
3
 See Tables 1 and 2 below, Part  III.C. 
4
 These interviews were conducted on the condition of anonymity; thus, any identifying information is 
excluded, with interviewees referred to as “informants” and each assigned a number for the purposes of this 
chapter. The transcripts of the interviews are on file with the author. 
5
  The term “generic” here borrows from Thomas Sowell, “Are Jews Generic?” in Black Rednecks and 
White Liberals (New York: Encounter Books, 2005), 76–122. In his usual provocative style, Sowell argues 
that hatred and persecution of Jews are generic in the sense that they have nothing to do with Jews per se. 
Rather, Jews are the classic “middleman minorit ies,” despised and discriminated against on account of the 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2631782 
cultural values and market conditions in American society after World War II, which saw 
a gradual decline in anti-Semitism and religious-based discrimination against Jews in 
America and an increased demand for legal services by large corporate clients.6 This 
account is generic in the sense that inherently it has nothing to do with Jewish law firms 
and Jewish lawyers, and, indeed, it intrinsically has nothing to do with Jews or with the 
legal profession itself. Rather, the decline of discrimination generally benefits minorities 
and in the context of the legal profession it benefited Jewish law firms and Jewish 
lawyers. Similarly, increased demand for corporate legal services benefited all law firms 
and led to the rise and growth of large law firms, including Jewish law firms. The generic 
explanation thus suggests that the reasons for the rise of the Jewish law firms were non-
legal; that is, they were to be found outside of the legal realm, and were not uniquely 
Jewish. The success of the Jewish law firms was nothing more than an example of the 
consequences of more general trends—the decline of discrimination and increased 
demand for legal services. 
       Yet, according to the informants interviewed in this chapter, Jewish law firms were 
not generic. While Jewish law firms certainly benefited from the decline in anti-Semitism 
and increased demand for legal services, a unique combination of factors explains the 
incredible rise of Jewish firms. First, white-shoe7 ethos caused large WASP firms to stay 
out of “undignified” practice areas and effectively created pockets of “Jewish” practice 
                                                                                                                                                 
intermediary ro le they play between producers and consumers as well as their distinctive social patterns. 
Sowell concludes: “While there are characteristics and achievements which are uniquely Jewish, the history 
of middleman minorit ies around the world seems to suggest that it has not been these uniquely Jewish 
characteristics which called forth venomous hatreds but characteristics and achievements common to 
middleman minorities . However unique [Jews] may be, historically the kind of hostility and hatred they 
have faced has been generic” (121–22). To be clear, I accept neither Sowell's conclusions regarding Jews in  
his essay nor the general themes in his book regarding the inferior cultural sensibilities of African-
Americans. I do, however, find instructive his use of “generic” and utilize it to draw a distinction between, 
on the one hand, generic non-legal and non-uniquely Jewish reasons and, on the other hand, legal and 
uniquely Jewish exp lanations that account for the rise of the Jewish law firms. 
6
 See Parts IV and V below. 
7
 The phrase “white-shoe” originally referred to elite college males who wore white buckskin shoes at Ivy 
League schools in the 1950s, and is used to describe law firms in America that were populated by members 
of the WASP elite and generally excluded anyone who was not a WASP male. See Elizabeth Chambliss, 
“The Shoe Still Fits,” Legal Affairs  10 (2005): 18–19. 
areas where the Jewish firms encountered little competition for their services. Second, 
discriminatory hiring and promotion practices by the large WASP firms helped create a 
large pool of talented Jewish lawyers from which the Jewish firms could easily recruit. 
Finally, the Jewish firms benefited from a “flip side of bias” phenomenon, that is, they 
benefited from the positive consequences of stereotyping.8 
       This chapter proceeds in eight parts. Parts II and III set up the discussion. Part II 
offers a brief history of the practice of law in New York City between the late nineteenth 
and the mid-twentieth centuries, highlighting the emergence of large WASP law firms 
and the existence of a lower stratum Jewish bar. Part III defines the notion of the Jewish 
law firm and documents the rise and growth of these firms. Parts IV and V investigate the 
“generic” trends within the American society and legal market that explain in part the 
remarkable success of the Jewish law firms. Specifically, Part IV explores the 
consequences of the decline of anti-Semitism and religious-based discrimination on 
Jewish law firms and Part V studies the impact of increased client demand for corporate 
services. Part VI examines a combination of unique factors that explain the growth of the 
Jewish firms: the existence of protected Jewish pockets of practice, the surprising 
consequences of effective WASP discrimination against Jewish lawyers and the effects of 
the “flip side of bias” phenomenon. Following a conclusion in Part VII, Part VIII is an 
appendix providing a methodological summary of the interviews that inform the analysis 
in this chapter. 
 
II. A Brief History of the Practice of Law in New York City 
 
A. Large Law Firms in New York City, 1900–1950 
 
       The large law firm emerged as a new unit of law practice around the turn of the 
                                                 
8
 See Part VI below. 
twentieth century.9 This type of firm's organizational structure, often referred to as the 
Cravath System, featured six characteristics: a hierarchical structure based on two distinct 
types of attorneys (partners and associates); close working relationships among firm 
attorneys, emphasizing teamwork as opposed to individual work product; investment in, 
and development of, candidate recruitment procedures followed by systematic training 
programs for associates; a probation period for associates, followed by promotion to 
partnership for some and an “up-or-out” policy for those not promoted; specialization of 
individual attorneys' expertise and departmentalization of work within the firm based on 
groupings of individual attorneys; and utilization of technology. 10 By the 1920s, the 
Cravath System dominated the expanding world of large law firms, 11 and by the 1960s 
                                                 
9
 See Magali S. Larson, “On the Nostalgic View of Lawyers' Role,”  Stanford Law Review 37 (1985): 448 
(“It is well known that the large law firm was born in the last third of the nineteenth century in a period of 
institutional reorganizat ion.”); Wayne K. Hobson, “Symbol of the New Profession: Emergence of the Large 
Law Firm, 1870–1915,” in The New High Priests: Lawyers in Post-Civil War America, ed. Gerald W. 
Gawalt (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1984), 3 (“The legal profession . . . was transformed between the 
1870s and the 1920s . . . Although most lawyers in 1930 still practiced alone or with one partner, the 
leaders of the profession were no longer men in such firms; they were now all in large firms.” ). See, 
generally, Marc Galanter and Thomas Palay, Tournament of Lawyers: The Transformation of the Big Law 
Firm (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 4. “Large” has a dynamic meaning. According to 
James Willard Hurst, “No firms of large membership appeared, even in the great cities, until the end of the 
[nineteenth] century. The typical partnership was a two-man affair” (The Growth of American Law 
[Boston: Little  Brown, 1950], 306). The benchmark for “large” reached fifty attorneys by the 1950s; see 
Erwin O. Smigel, “The Impact of Recruitment on the Organization of the Large Law Firm,” American 
Sociological Review 25 (1960): 58. By the late 1980s, “a firm of 50 members probably would not be 
considered large” in major cities (Justin A. Stanley, “Should Lawyers St ick to Their Last?,” Indiana Law 
Journal 64 [1989]: 473). In August 2007, the largest law firm in the world was Baker & McKenzie, with a 
total of 3535 attorneys. See Lindsay Fortadoa, “Dewey Ballantine, LeBoeuf Agree to Merge Law Firms,” 
Washington Post, August 28, 2007. Since 2008, restructuring in the market for corporate legal services and 
the Great Recession halted the growth of large American law firms. See Marc Galanter and William 
Henderson, “The Elastic Tournament: A Second Transformat ion of the Big Law Firm,” Stanford Law 
Review 60 (2008): 1867–1929; Eli Wald, “Foreword: The Great Recession and the Legal Profession,” 
Fordham Law Review 78 (2010): 2051–66; Bernard A. Burk and David McGo wan, “Big but Brittle: 
Economic Perspectives on the Future of the Law Firm in the New Economy,” Columbia Business Law 
Review (2011): 1–117; Eli Wald, “Smart Growth: The Large Law Firm in the Twenty -First Century,” 
Fordham Law Review 80 (2012): 2867–2915. 
10
 See Eli Wald, “The Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms,” Stanford Law Review 60 (2008): 
1806–10. See, generally, Galanter and Palay, Tournament of Lawyers , 4–19. 
11
 See Wayne K. Hobson, The American Legal Profession and the Organizational Society 1890–1930 (New 
York: Garland Publishing, 1986), 201. By the 1920s the system Cravath had initiated was well established 
and regularized. The managing clerks of the leading law firms had even entered into a gentlemen's 
agreement after World War I to eliminate the practice of competit ive bidding for the services of the most 
promising law school graduates. They established uniform beginning salaries and agreed not to pirate 
employees away from each other.  
large firms reached their “Golden Era”12 in terms of being recognized as the elite of the 
American legal profession.13  
       Wall Street, New York City was essentially the birth-place of the large law firm.14 
During the first half of the twentieth century Wall Street housed not only Cravath, 
Swaine & Moore, the paradigmatic large firm, but also a significant number of all large 
American law firms. In 1948, there were 284 law firms in the United States with eight or 
more partners, located in fifty-seven different cities, with New York City accounting for 
seventy-three of them. From 1950 through 1970, at least eight of the ten largest firms in 
the country were New York City firms.15 Indeed, until the 1970s, due to the concentration 
of large law firms in New York City, the terms large “American” and “New York City” 
law firms could be used interchangeably.16 Moreover, the impact of New York City on 
the rise and growth of large law firms was not limited to the mere number of firms it 
hosted and its role as a key business and financial center, which enabled the Wall Street 
firms to rise to dominance; rather, Wall Street itself emerged as the symbolic home of the 
large firms—the new legal elite.17  
       The large law firm reflected a new professional ideology significantly different from 
the era's prevailing notions of lawyering. It purported to be a meritocracy in which hiring 
                                                 
12
 Galanter and Palay, Tournament of Lawyers, 20. 
13
 Robert L. Nelson, Partners with Power: The Social Transformation of the Large Law Firm (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1988). Nelson describes the large law firm as sitting “atop the pyramid of 
prestige and power within the American legal profession. Although comprising but a small fraction of 
lawyers, through its impact on patterns of recruitment, styles of practice, and the collective institutions of 
the bar, the large law firm has a significance that far exceeds the number of lawyers it employs ” (1). 
14
 According to Galanter and Palay, large firms grew in size, first in New York City, then in other large 
cities, then in smaller cities, then overseas  (Tournament of Lawyers, 14, 18–19). 
15
 Robert L. Nelson, “Practice and Privilege: Social Change and the Structure of Large Law Firms,” 
American Bar Foundation Research Journal 6 (1981): 104. For a discussion of the growth of large law 
firms outside of New York City, see Hobson, American Legal Profession and the Organizational Society 
1890–1930, 163–88. 
16
 By the late 1970s, New York City lost its dominance as large law firms grew nation-wide. By 1979, all 
but Shearman & Sterling had been displaced on the largest law firms list by the largest firms of other cities. 
See below note 93. 
17
 See, e .g., David T. Bazelon, “Portrait of a Business Generalist,” Comment 24 (1960): 279 (“There is a 
nice vignette to be written about the popular displacement in the past few decades of the historic phrase 
‘Philadelphia lawyer’ by the new and more magical ‘New York lawyer.”’).  
and promotion were based upon performance, replacing traditional notions of nepotism, 
privilege, and class hierarchies. In 1920 Paul Cravath put this change into words as he 
advised his hearers that for success at the New York bar “family influence, social 
friendships and wealth count for little.” He further emphasized the large number of 
successful lawyers who had come to New Yo rk from small places and “worked up from 
the bottom of the ladder without having any advantage of position or acquaintance.”18  
       In spite of their claim to meritocracy, however, large New York City law firms 
recruited and promoted almost exclusively WASP attorneys and featured a white-shoe 
Protestant culture.19 Jewish attorneys were rarely recruited and even less commonly 
promoted to partnership.20 Thus, the large New York City law firm club circa 1950 
consisted entirely of WASP white-shoe law firms.21 
 
B. Jewish Lawyers in New York City, 1900–1950 
 
       The large law firm rose against a backdrop of a changing legal profession. In 1885 
there were about 5,000 lawyers in New York City, about 400 of whom were Jewish.22 
The new century brought waves of immigrants and growth to the New York Bar. The 
years between 1890 and 1910 witnessed an immense growth in part time and evening 
programs in law schools, as well as great growth in the number of lawyers born abroad or 
                                                 
18
 Robert T. Swaine, The Cravath Firm and its Predecessors: 1819–1947 (New York: Ad Press, 1948), 
265. Similarly, Arthur Dean of Su llivan & Cromwell opined: “ In today's larger legal partnerships 
advancement is by and large by competence alone. Those who achieve positions of influence and 
leadership in such firms tend to be those who have manifested their ability to relate into a more 
comprehensive picture diverse fields of specializat ion and to view the major problems of client s in a broad 
social perspective” (Arthur H. Dean, William Nelson Cromwell 1854–1948: An American Pioneer in 
Corporation, Comparative and International Law  [New York: Ad Press, 1957], 85).  
19
 See Wald, “Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms,” 1810–25, which explores the apparent 
contradiction between the large law firm's meritocratic claim and its religious and cultural identity. 
20
 Note, “The Jewish Law Student and New York Jobs: Discriminatory Effects in Law Firm Hiring 
Practices,” Yale Law Journal 73 (1964): 626, 635. 
21
 See Part VI below. 
22
 Henry W. Taft, Legal Miscellanies: Six Decades of Changes and Progress (New York: Macmillan, Co., 
1941), 77. 
with foreign-born parents.23 The newcomers crowded the lower stratum of the bar, 
competing fiercely for clients and a livelihood. 24 Top educational credentials served as 
barriers to exclude these unwelcome newcomers. 25 Indeed, “barriers to access became 
more formidable as the desirability of access increased . . . [and] professional opportunity 
depended upon ethnic, social, religious, and educational credentials.”26 In this formative 
era of the New York City legal profession, “Cromwells and Cravaths rose to the top; 
‘Hebrews’ sank to the bottom.”27  
       Both trends—the growth of the bar and the increased stratification—continued to 
dominate the New York City legal profession even after 1950, so much so that “in 1960, 
there were approximately 26,000 lawyers in Manhattan and the Bronx, about 20,500 of 
whom were active practitioners,” and 17,000 of whom were in private practice. 28 The 
city's bar was almost all native-born white males, and was slightly over sixty percent 
Jewish.29 At the same time, ethnic- and religious-based discrimination (intertwined with 
socio-economic-cultural bias) in the large law firm segment of the New York City bar 
became common knowledge.30 Moreover, “Jewish lawyers [were] less likely than their 
non-Jewish colleagues to gain access to the high-status position in the bar.”31 While they 
constituted sixty percent of the New York City Bar, Jewish lawyers were overly 
represented in individual practice (seventy-seven percent) and small firms (seventy-six 
                                                 
23
 Jerold S. Auerbach, Unequal Justice: Lawyers and Social Change in Modern America  (New York: 




 Ibid., 95–101. 
26
 Ibid., 25. 
27
 Ibid., 26. 
28
 Jerome E. Carlin, Lawyers' Ethics: A Survey of the New York City Bar (New York: Russell Sage 
Foundation, 1966), 11. 
29
 Ibid., 18–19. 
30
 “The Jewish Law Student and New York Jobs,” 635 (“Gentiles were more successful than Jews in 
getting good jobs, and in getting the jobs of their choice.”).  
31
 Carlin, Lawyers’ Ethics, 22. 
percent), and significantly under-represented in large law firms (twenty-five percent).32  
 
C. New York, New York 
 
       In the first half of the twentieth century Wall Street was the center of corporate law 
practice and had a larger concentration of large law firms than anywhere else in the 
country and the world. New York City was also where the large Jewish law firm emerged 
after 1950.33 It is important to note, however, that the rise of the WASP firms, and 
subsequently the Jewish firms, was not restricted geographically to New York City and 
took place in other large metropolises; first in Chicago, Washington, D.C., Boston, and 
Philadelphia, later expanding to the west coast, and eventually spreading to many large 
cities throughout the United States.34 
       Nonetheless, the informants suggest that both the rise of Jewish law firms and the 
success of Jewish lawyers were due, at least in part, to the unique professional and 
cultural conditions present in New York City. For example, describing the ideology and 
approach of the New York City Bar Association, an informant observed: 
 
It's sort of like the legal conscience of the world. There is no subject the New York 
City Bar, a city, local bar association will not comment on, anything, human rights 
in China. The City Bar has a very expansive notion of its jurisdiction. And I went to 
the meetings of the House of Delegates for the New York State Bar because it's 
such an extraordinarily interesting social institution. And New York is almost a 
microcosm of the country. [On the other hand] I've never been active in the ABA, 
it's just too big for me, too monolithic.35  
 
       A partner at a large Jewish firm captured the interplay between cultural and 
professional conditions in New York City and its impact on the practice of law: 
                                                 
32
 Ibid., 28. Protestants attorneys, on the other hand, who constituted only about eighteen percent of the bar, 
accounted for forty-three percent of the large law firm pool, and only nine percent of the individual 
practitioner pool.  
33
 See Part III.C below. 
34
 See, e .g., Toni M. Massaro, F. Daniel Frost and the Rise of the Modern American Law Firm  (Tucson: 
The University of Arizona, 2011) (on the transformation of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher from a Califo rnia-
based regional to a global law firm).  
35
 Informant #12, 17–18. 
 
A Shomer Shabbas [Sabbath observer] attorney will work Saturday night or Sunday 
to make up the time. In almost all cases, it doesn't upset the work flow at all. . . . A 
number of times in my career, I had to impose on other attorneys to take over on a 
Friday or Yom Tov [a day of religious observance], and it is even more difficult for 
a day or a few days. I always feel uncomfortable when . . . imposing on somebody 
to do that. Sometimes clients have to understand what's going on, especially if you 
are not a New Yorker and they don't quite understand what it is all about. 36  
 
       Other informants explored the less obvious impact of New York City and its culture 
on the rise of Jewish law firms. For instance, one informant said : 
 
That is partly America, partly New York, which is very polyglot and we hardly 
realize it, but you accept it and you only recognize it when someone comes from 
outside of New York and step[s] in a subway and [is] startled by the multiple 
nationalit[ies] and races and everything, which we take completely for granted. 37  
 
 
       Another informant described the present impact of New York culture with the 
following remarks: 
 
For sure, New York City has always, in my judgment, been more progressive and is 
more progressive today- liberal or progressive-call it what you will, in accepting . . . 
diversity than places in the Midwest . . . I'm sure New York is way ahead. I know, 
from personal experience, that when it comes to prejudice against women . . . there 
are firms in the Midwest that are back where [New York was] thirty years ago. . . . 
Five or ten years ago, one of the major firms [down south] had a “wet t-shirt” 
contest at their summer outing . . . I remember reading about that and saying, “Are 
they in the Middle Ages?” I mean, there's no way a thing like that could happen at . 
. . any New York City law firm. We're just ahead.38  
 
 
III. The Meaning of a Jewish Firm 
 
A. The Jewishness of the Jewish Firms 
 
 
       In this chapter, a Jewish law firm refers to a firm whose majority of lawyers, both 
partners and associates, between 1950 and 1980 were Jewish. While there is no precise 
record of the religious affiliation of their attorneys, law firms were commonly known as 
                                                 
36
 Informant #6, 13. 
37
 Informant #4, 17. 
38
 Informant #5, 13. 
WASP, Jewish, Catholic, or mixed. For instance, one informant stated, “In those days, I 
think, there were some Jewish firms—predominant Jewish firms—and non-Jewish 
firms.”39 Another informant labeled a specific firm “a Jewish firm,” adding, “The counsel 
of the firm was James Marshall, son of Louie Marshall. The make-up was really Jewish. 
That firm was still . . . a Jewish firm. It might have had non Jewish [assoc iates] but all of 
the partners were Jewish.”40  
       By a “Jewish” firm, I do not mean to suggest that such a firm featured a unique 
Jewish firm culture, any specific Jewish values, professional or otherwise, or any 
commitment to or knowledge of Jewish law.41 In fact, the Jewish firms were Jewish by 
discriminatory default; namely, due to the discriminatory hiring and promotion practices 
at the elite WASP firms, many Jewish attorneys flocked to the “Jewish” firms, thus 
constituting these firms as Jewish.42  
       In theory, Jewish law firms could have developed as institutions organized around 
Jewish themes, values, and culture.43 One can imagine, for example, law firms with a 
special commitment to the notion of doing mitzvahs (i.e., good deeds) in the form of 
enhanced pro bono.44 An informant postulated that Jewish firms, or at least Jewish 
partners, could build on the affinity between Jewish law and American law and use the 
                                                 
39
 Informant #6, 6. 
40
 Informant #2, 5, 8. 
41
 In contrast, WASP firms did have a uniquely Protestant identity, coupled with a white-shoe cultural 
identity. See Wald, “Rise and Fall of the WASP and Jewish Law Firms,” 1810–25. 
42
 See Part VI below. 
43
 On the relationship between faith and professional identity, see, generally, Thomas L. Shaffer, Faith and 
the Professions (Provo, Utah: Brigham Young University, 1987); Marc Galanter, “A Vocat ion for Law? 
American Jewish Lawyers and Their Antecedents,” Fordham Urban Law Journal 26 (1999): 1125–47. On 
the interplay between religious identity and professional identity, see Sanford Levinson, “Identifying the 
Jewish Lawyer: Reflect ions on the Construction of Professional Identity,” Cardozo Law Review 14 (1993): 
1577–1612; Martha Minow, “On Being a Relig ious Professional: The Religious Turn in Professional 
Ethics,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 150  (2001): 661–68; Russell G. Pearce, “Reflect ions on 
the American Jewish Lawyer,” Journal of  Law & Religion 17 (2002): 179–88. 
44
 Indeed, historically, Jewish law firms were known for their commitment to pro bono work. For example, 
“The Scholarship and Defense Fund for Racial Equality (CORE SCDF) . . . was a mixed black and white 
group . . . It fell apart with the rise of Black Power and tensions in New York City between Jews and 
Blacks . . . Both Jews of World War II, and Israel and Blacks were all viewed as underdogs, and still 
remain to this day. And so that was an outlet” (Informant #2, 10). 
latter to instruct and introduce young Jewish students to the former. 45 To be clear, 
however, Jewish law firms did not develop such a Jewish identity. While many Jewish 
lawyers were actively involved with Jewish causes, their support was usually rendered in 
their personal capacity outside of their legal practice rather than in their professio nal 
capacity as lawyers. Judaism did not emerge as a central organizational theme or 
underlying professional value. For instance, one informant recalled : 
 
When I was interviewed [by a large Jewish firm,] I mentioned that I was a Sabbath 
observer; the person who interviewed me wanted to know what that was although 
he was  
Jewish. . . . I explained it to him [and] . . . he said, “Just work your tail off we don't 
care when it is and that will be that.”46  
 
 
       Another informant noted: 
 
Being [observant] was much more of a problem in terms of these [Jewish] firms 
than just the mere fact that you were Jewish or Catholic, from my point of view. I 
remember being interviewed in well-established Jewish firms. One I can remember 
now the partner who interviewed me was a Shomer Shabbat [Sabbath observer] 
himself and he told me that it would be a mistake for me to come there because of 
the hard time he had. And then going to another firm the guy said to me, “well, 
you're going to have to go home early on Friday.” Kind of put me in that kind of a 
corner. And I was interviewed by some big [Jewish] firms. But it was more . . . like 
a courtesy, I think, everybody was just going through the motions.47  
 
 
The informant went as far as to characterize practice realities at the Jewish firms as 
discriminatory vis-à-vis observant Jewish attorneys, noting: 
                                                 
45
 The informant believes that, currently, Jewish law and legal studies inform and enhance each other: 
“Certainly today it [referring to the synergy between Jewish and legal studies] does  . . . I think it's a 
tremendous thing to teach kids [today], to show the roots when you're teaching a high school class because 
they're smart kids, you know, they're in h igh school already to teach them that the roots of law in the United 
States, where law's derived from is fascinating it helps strengthen their belief in the Talmud and in the 
Jewish tradit ion and their continuity and also, I think it's just fascinating” (Informant #15, 10). On the 
affinity between Jews and American law, see generally, Jero ld S. Auerbach, Rabbis and Lawyers: The 
Journey from Torah to Constitution  (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990). 
46
 Informant #10, 3. 
47
 Informant #7, 1–3. Moreover, the same informant reported, “I'd say the lawyers I knew were kind of 
single practitioners, kind of more my father's peers. And if they were observant they had to be single 
practitioners because they couldn't get jobs anywhere else” (6). Another observant Jew, working for a large 
Jewish firm believed that “I was the first Orthodox hired by a Jewish firm” (Informant #14, 2). 
 
I like to think of [an observant Jewish attorney with a large Jewish law firm] as a 
role model except he came after me [graduating in 1958]. In my view, for whatever 
it's worth, I think he's the guy who broke the glass ceiling [for observant Jewish 
attorneys at Jewish firms] so far as many people were concerned. When he made 
the success that he did make very quickly, it opened the door to Yeshiva graduates 
who were observant.48  
 
 
        Another informant describing the hiring patterns of Jewish law firms noted, “The 
major Jewish law firms weren't hiring first or second generation Jews.”49 Other observant 
informants, however, had a more pleasant experience interviewing with Jewish firms: 
 
During the interviewing process [my religious observance] sometimes came up and 
came up also to the effect that I would not work on Saturday. [At one interview] 
someone said, ‘you're exactly what we want, I hope you'll work on Saturday when 
we need you,’ and I told them, ‘no I won't work on Saturday.’ He said, ‘it won't 
happen too often.’ I said, ‘no it won't work.’ So that was more of the negative type 
of interview. In this firm, as in most of the [Jewish] firms, at least the spoken word 
was that there would be no problem, that they would support the fact that I had to 
leave early on Friday and not come in on Saturday. But sometimes you never know 
until you get someplace.50  
 
 
       Of course, some Jewish lawyers were not as ignorant of Jewish customs and habits, 
yet they still chose not to emphasize their Jewish identity, let alone celebrate it as an 
important component of their professional identity.51 One informant witnessed this 
behavior, stating: 
 
I know people that are involved heavily in the Jewish federation . . . They got 
involved in the 50's and the 60's and thought [that] to be involved in [the] federation 
you should take off the Yarmulke when you go into the building. . . . It's interesting. 
                                                 
48
 Informant #7, 6. 
49
 Informant #17, 17. 
50
 Informant #18, 6–7. 
51
 That is not to suggest that Jewish identity, values , and experiences did not indirectly influence and shape 
the professional culture and organization of Jewish firms. One informant, fo r example, d iscussing the 
growth pattern of his firm, noted: “Probably the fundamental thing was, we were never sure where we 
would be going and so on. When you start out, you can go one of two ways. One, you can sort of gamble  
and keep expanding and so on. The other you can be very conservative and not take the next step until 
you're sure you have the right base. All o f us were basically very conservative people. We never felt that 
confident that tomorrow would be there so that was probably fundamental” (Informant #17, 11). The same 
informant further explained, “Well, keep in mind, we grew up during the Depression, we didn't come from 
rich families, never sure that we were going to be that successfu l” (13). 
Every once in a while Clinton used to say to me, “Rabbi . . . ” I insisted I didn't 
want to be called Rabbi even though I was [a Rabbi] . . . I wanted them to know a 
layman wears a Yarmulke.52 
 
 
       In some instances, Jewish interests were outweighed by the desire for 
professionalism and loyalty to clients' interests. A partner at a large Jewish law firm 
described his firm's decision to open an office in Germany, despite the legacy of the 
Holocaust, as follows: 
 
Frankfurt is the center of business across Europe and if we were going to grow, we 
had to be there, and our clients insisted that we go. We have clients that are very 
active in the European markets and, you know, if you don't want to open, that's fine, 
but we'll go elsewhere.53  
 
 
       One can take opposite views regarding the Jewish reaction to post-Holocaust 
Germany, ranging from opposition to opening an office in Germany to celebrating such 
an office as a triumph over evil. What is significant about the informant's perspective is 
that it reflects no Jewish consideration whatsoever.54 The relevant issues were clients' 
needs and the firm's competitiveness in global legal markets.55  
 
       Certainly, Jewish firms employing nearly exclusively Jewish attorneys developed 
some benefits from the homogeneous religious affiliation of their practitioners. An 
attorney in a Jewish firm confirmed: 
 
We had a . . . very nice firm. It was congenial. There were never any real problems 
with rooms. Everybody kind of liked everybody else. I never brought up at a firm 
meeting any issue unless I had first cleared it with most of the partners. It was 
                                                 
52
 Informant #10, 13–14. 
53




 Ibid. Similarly, another informant recalled a conversation in which he was told about a prominent Jewish 
attorney representing a Congressional committee. On a Friday evening, a member of the committee asked 
the attorney, “‘Mr. XXX, don't you have to go home?’ So I said, ‘Well what did Mr. XXX say?’ An d he 
said [that Mr. XXX rep lied,] ‘Oh Mr. Senator, for matters of national security I'm permitted to violate the 
Sabbath”’ (Informant #15, 22). Once again, client needs and professional identity took precedence over 
personal identity and religious observance. 
 
worth the time and the aggravation to persuade people, so there was never a hostile 
vote taken or anything like that.56  
 
 
       Moreover, at times, Jewish elements did impact the practice of law at the Jewish 
firms. For example, an informant said of his Sabbath observance: 
 
Many times when I leave on Friday, my non-Jewish partners and associates see me  
leave . . . They see that advantage I have by having a strict regimen which can't be 
violated. I have to say, it probably does give to me a psychological advantage over 
many of the people who don't have that rest or can't count on the rest. 57  
 
 
Similarly, another said of Yom Kippur observance: 
 
So the joke around here was: there was a relatively senior lawyer, a partner in the 
corporate department . . . a very devout Catholic . . . We called him the “house guy” 
because the question was if he's good what is he doing here, why isn't he downtown 
or something like that? He would call me every February. I'll never forget, every 
February he'd say, “Yom Kippur, it’s six months from now.” I'd say, “Why do you 
care?” and his answer was, “Well, the trouble is, I'm always setting meetings with 
Jewish lawyers and they never think of these things and then suddenly we find 
out—oh, the day before Yom Kippur—[they] can't come to the meeting [because] 
it's Yom Kippur.”58  
 
 
       Also affecting the practice of law at the Jewish firms was a particular emphasis on 
the pro bono commitments and extra-curricular activities of Jewish partners, as is noted 
in the following: 
 
At that time, there was no such thing as a program to go to Israel for a year after 
high school. . . . In fact, some years later on, I helped to set that up, eventually. 
That's a whole separate story. Someone now in Israel wanted to go, needed Jewish 
Agency approval to get the money . . . I knew people at the Jewish Agency [who] 
went to Israel, met with the appropriate people, but that's a different success story. 59  
 
 
       Another informant said of such extra-curricular involvement: “I got involved in the 
Jewish Community Relations Council which is a bridge, kind of an umbrella over sixty 
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 Informant #1, 9. 
57
 Informant #6, 15. 
58
 Informant #10, 2–3. 
59
 Informant #4, 2. 
different organizations and worked on the Committee [in various roles].”60  
       Yet, unlike Black corporate firms,61 Jewish law firms did not have a mission to 
create lasting Jewish institutions. The Jewish firms were Jewish by discriminatory 
default, and Judaism simply did not play a constitutive role in their organization and 
professional identity. One informant's account of the role of Judaism in his life captures 
the role Judaism played in many Jewish firms: “I have been interested in my Jewish 
roots. I identify and am interested in the Jewish tradition and its scholarship and play 
with that occasionally. I suppose it was Stendahl who said ‘life is love and work.’ And I 
have been very happy in my marriage and my family and have been generally very happy 
in my work. And I continue to support humanitarian causes with hope if not with 
optimism.”62 While certainly mindful of his Jewish roots, Judaism for the informant was 
separate and distinct from his work, something to “play with” after hours, something that 
informs, in an indirect fashion, commitment to humanitarian causes. 63 Similarly, in many 
Jewish firms and for many Jewish lawyers both at Jewish and at WASP firms, Judaism 
was of interest, a source that informed pro bono and extra-curricular activities, and yet it 
                                                 
60
 Informant #2, 11. Another noted: “when you're a Jewish lawyer, you definitely get approached by, you 
know, causes, working for legal services they figure will appeal to you, so you have that kind of work, so 
certainly, you know synagogues” (Informant #15, 31). 
61
 See David Wilkins, “‘If You Can't Join ‘em Beat ‘em!’ The Rise and Fall of the Black Corporate Law 
Firm,”  Stanford Law Review 60 (2008): 1733–1801. 
62
 Informant #3, 91. 
63
 The separation between one's professional identity as an attorney and one's relig ious identity as a Jew 
was likewise noted by several informants: “The people of my generation [following WWII and the 
Holocaust] even if we were not personally touched, we were touched, so that has basically defined my 
interests; I think that plus the fact that I was ambitious, I wanted to succeed, I worked hard, I did everything 
I could to advance my position but I always from that time became touched by Jewish issues” (Informant 
#13, 6). Moreover, the same informant reported, “The religious identity was something that I developed as 
time went by. My background, training, from schools and professional experiences [was different], relig ion 
was not a part of it at all.” Another informant exp lained: “I would say that [my relig ious identity] was not 
relevant to [my professional identity]. I mean, I am familiar with Jewish charities and such but I don't think 
one had anything to do with the other” (Informant #19, 8). But for one informant, his Jewish identity, 
culture, and experience did in form and shape the practice of law: “[My interest in immigrat ion law] was 
sparked by my study of Jewish history. I have felt always  . . . you know if you do a study of what went on 
in the 1930s, the German quota was open at all times fo r immigration to the United States and if you go 
through the correspondence between the American Consul General in Berlin and his superiors in 
Washington . . . you'll see that these anti-Semites said, ‘no Jews.’ So I felt that I could help people [in such] 
circumstances . . . and I have had the privilege over the years of doing a lot of such cases” (Informant #20, 
12–13). 
was independent of their “work,” the practice of law.  
       Another informant questioned, “it is hard [for a person] to separate religious identity 
from other identities” and “I always tried to do the right thing. Is it [doing the right thing] 
being Jewish?”64 Similarly he was uncertain about what it would mean for the firm to 
have a Jewish identity, saying, “People like people they can deal with and feel they 
know. So religion in that sense was relevant.”65 But beyond such a sense of cultural 
familiarity, he did not believe Judaism played a role in the organization, structure and 
practice of the firm.66  
 
B. Who is a Jew? 
 
 
       The issue of defining Jewish identity is a highly controversial one. In the context of 
characterizing law firms, even the basic definition of a Jewish firm as one that employed 
a majority of Jewish attorneys is not without its challenges because no record lists 
lawyers by their religious affiliation. That said, for the purposes of this chapter, such a 
headcount is not necessary, nor is a “definite” list of all Jewish law firms of the era.  
      Instead, suffice it to note that commonly referred to Jewish law firms included 
“traditional” Jewish law firms established before 1950 (such as Stroock & Stroock & 
Lavan; Weil, Gotshal; Kaye, Scholer; Proskauer, Rose; Fried, Frank; and the Rosenman 
firm) and “start-up” Jewish firms founded in the early 1960s (such as Schulte, Roth & 
Zabel, and Kramer, Levin).67 In addition, a group of mixed firms, never known as Jewish 
law firms, existed with a significant contingency of Jewish attorneys, some “traditional” 
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 A partner at a start-up Jewish firm described his first few years of practice with an established mixed 
firm as “happy years.” Along with colleagues  from several other Jewish firms as well as from h is own firm, 
he helped establish a somewhat less “traditional,” more “entrepreneurial” firm (Informant #16, 2–3). 
(Paul, Weiss68 and Cleary, Gottlieb69), and others “start-up” (Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & 
Katz70  and Skadden, Arps71).72  
 
C. The Rise and Growth of the Jewish Law Firms 
 
 
       In 1950 the New York City elite corporate bar consisted of only well-established, 
large law firms. Without exception, every member of the elite club was a WASP law 
firm. Not a single member of the elite large law firm club was a Jewish firm; in fact, 
there were no large Jewish firms in New York City. 73 This is not surprising given that 
five years earlier, in 1945, not a single Jewish firm had more than ten lawyers. As one 
                                                 
68
 The firm was formed in 1945 as Mr. Weiss and Mr. Wharton joined forces with Mr. Paul and M r. 
Garrison. Unique not only in the heterogeneous relig ious affiliation of its named partners and attorneys, 
Paul, Weiss was the first major Wall Street law firm to move to midtown (in 1949), the first to elect a 
female partner (in 1946 at its D.C. office) and the first to hire a black associate. Judge Rifkind joined the 
firm in 1950, and the firm enhanced its reputation as a leading lit igation law firm. By 1949, the firm had 13 
lawyers; by 1970, the firm had 110 lawyers; and by 1972, it had 138. See Paul Hoffman, Lions in the 
Street: The Inside Story of the Great Wall Street Law Firms (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1973), 
112–21. 
69
  Cleary, Gottlieb was formed fo llowing a split from Root Carter. “Most Jewish attorneys followed 
Gottlieb to Cleary,” and Gottlieb became the first Jewish named partner in a major Wall Street law firm 
(Hoffman, Lions in the Street, 65). The firm grew rapidly, from 17 attorneys as of December 31, 1946, to 
27 lawyers four years later, and to 63 lawyers on December 31, 1960. See Leo Gottlieb, Cleary, Gottlieb, 
Steen & Hamilton: The First Thirty Years (New York: The Firm, 1983), 76–77, 138. 
70
  Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz was formed by four Jewish partners. Like Pau l, Weiss, Cleary, and 
Skadden, Wachtell never developed a reputation as a Jewish firm, quickly earn ing a reputation as one of the 
elite law firms in New York City and setting the mark for the highest paid associates and the highest 
profits-per-partner. See Steven Brill, “Two Tough Lawyers in the Tender Offer Game,” New York 
Magazine, June 21, 1976, at 55 (describing Skadden, Arps and Wachtell, Lipton as “younger firms, many 
of which were started by Jewish lawyers who were not as welcome then at the old -line firms”). Wachtell 
has maintained its reputation as a leader in p rofit-per-partner. See http:// 
www.abajournal.com/weekly/skadden_wachtell_top_amlaw_100 (last visited July 10, 2013). 
71
  In 1963 Skadden, Arps had ten lawyers. By 1980, it had 205; and, by 2004, it was the second largest law 
firm in New York City with over 1700 attorneys. Skadden, Arps never developed a reputation as a Jewish 
firm, although many of its attorneys, including some of its founders, were Jewish. See Brill, “Two Tough 
Lawyers in the Tender Offer Game,” 55. See, generally, Lincoln Caplan, Skadden: Power, Money, and the 
Rise of a Legal Empire (New York: Noonday Press, 1993). 
72
  One informant exp lained that while the “mixed” firms never developed a reputation for being “Jewish ,” 
the Jewish firms, defined as recruiting and promoting almost exclusively Jewish attorneys, underwent 
“Cravathization”; that is, over time they began to regularly recruit and promote the best talent, Jewish and 
non-Jewish attorneys alike, to overcome and “get outside the charac terization of a Jewish firm” (Informant 
#16, 5). The sentiment is consistent with an account given by another informant, a partner at a mixed firm, 
who explained that the hiring criteria at h is firm were always based on merit : “One of the reasons we 
thought it was very important to hire out of law school is  that we wanted people to sort of grow up with us” 
(Informant #17, 15). See Part VII below. 
73
   In 1950, when the benchmark for a large firm was 50 lawyers, Weil, Gotshal was the largest Jewish law 
firm with a total of 19 attorneys; Kaye, Scholer had 18; Paul, Weiss had 17; Proskauer, Rose had 15; 
Stroock & Stroock & Lavan had 13; Fried, Frank had 12; and the Rosenman firm had 7. See the 
Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory (Summit, N.J.: Mart indale-Hubbell, 1950). 
interviewee confirmed, “[There were no] Jewish firms . . . [in] the 50s. [The Jewish 
firms] were very small firms . . . [One] existed with eight lawyers.74  
 
Table 1: Jewish Law Firms in New York City, 1932–195075  
 
Firm Name 1932 1935 1940 1945 1950 
Fried, Frank, 
Harris, Shriver, 
& Jacobson76  
777  678  879  680  1281  
Weil, Gotshal & 
Manges 
3 3 9 12 (+1  
tax counsel) 
18 (+1 in 
Washington
, DC office) 
Cleary, 
Gottlieb, Steen 
& Hamilton82  
N/A N/A N/A N/A 6 (+1 in 
Washington
, DC office, 


















N/A N/A 4 9 1888  
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 Informant #8, 7. 
75
 Numbers are based on Martindale-Hubbell Directories for the years 1932 (the first year it was published) 
and 1935 through 1950, at five-year intervals. 
76
  Fried, Frank's predecessor was Limburg, Riegelman, Hess & Hirsch. Walter Fried joined the Riegleman  
firm in the late 1930s or 1940. 
77
  Limburg, Riegelman, Hirsch & Hess. Walter Fried was apparently a solo practitioner.  
78
  Riegelman, Hirsch & Hess. Walter Fried was still apparently a solo practitioner.  
79
 Walter Fried was part of the firm by this time.  
80
  Riegelman, Strasser, Schwarz & Spiegelberg. 
81
   H.J. Frank had joined the firm by this time. Frank was apparently in solo practice before his association 
with the Riegelman firm. 
82
  See Hoffman, Lions in the Street, 62–63 (stating that Cleary, Gottlieb was formed in 1945 when George 
Cleary and Leo Gottlieb left the well-established Root Clark firm). 
83
  Cleary, Gottlieb, Friendly & Fox.  
84
  Paul, Weiss grew out of the firm of Cohen, C (name could not be determined), Weiss & Wharton. 
85
 1932, 1935, 1940, and 1945 numbers all reflect Cohen, C, Weiss & Wharton. See Hoffman, Lions in the 
Street, 112 (Paul, Weiss, Wharton & Garrison was formed in 1945 and had 13 lawyers).  
86
  By 1958, the firm had grown to fifty lawyers. See Hoffman, Lions in the Street, 45. 
87
 The firm was known as Stroock & Stroock until the 1940s. Peter I.B. Lavan, a .k.a. Peter I.B. Lev ine, 
joined the firm in 1945 accord ing to Martindale-Hubbell Directory. 
88
 By 1958, the firm had grown to 43 lawyers. See Hoffman, Lions in the Street, 45. 






N/A N/A N/A N/A 7 
 
          
        By the mid 1960s, however, this reality had changed significantly. Growing much 
faster than the WASP firms, the Jewish firms had “caught up” with the WASP firms and 
penetrated the elite law firm club, constituting six of the twenty largest law firms in New 
York City. In less than a fifteen-year time span, Jewish law firms grew, as a group, at an 
average of 200%, with Fried, Frank and Paul, Weiss growing by 400% and Kaye, Scholer 
by 375%. To be sure, WASP firms also grew at an impressive rate. As a group, however, 
WASP firms grew at 50% the rate of Jewish firms, averaging about 100%. This trend of 
faster growth continued between 1963 and 1980, and by 1980 Jewish firms accounted for 
four of the ten largest firms in New York City. WASP firms also grew at an impressive 
rate; however, except for Shearman & Sterling, all of the WASP firms grew by less than 
100% during this time.92  
 
Table 2: New York City Large Law Firms93  
 
Firm Name 1950 1963 1981 
Shearman & Sterling 31 134 335 
                                                 
89
 Proskauer, Rose & Paskus. 
90
  Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Mendelsohn. 
91
  Hoffman indicates this was another of the “Jewish giants” (Lions in the Street, 33). Its predecessors were 
Rosenberg, Goldmark & Colin (Martindale-Hubbell, 1932) and Goldmark, Colin & Kaye (Martindale-
Hubbell, 1945). By 1950, it was known as Rosenman, Goldmark, Colin & Kaye. In 1973, when Lions in 
the Street was published, it was known as Rosenman, Colin, Kaye, Petschek, Freund & Emil.  
92
 Informat ion in the preceding paragraph regarding the largest New York City law firms be tween 1963 and 
2006 was collected using the following sources: “Growth of 20 Large Law Firms-1963–1981,”  New York 
Law Journal, Mar. 16, 1981, 3; “National Law Firm Survey,” National Law Journal, Sept. 18, 1978, 14–
17; “National Law Firm Survey,” National Law Journal, Oct. 6, 1980, 32–37; “The NLJ 250,”  National 
Law Journal, Sept. 30, 1985, S4–S18; “The NLJ 250,”  National  Law Journal, Sept. 24, 1990, S4S32; “The 
20 Largest Firms Based in New York City,” New York Law Journal, Oct. 1, 1990, S3–S4; “The NLJ 250,” 
National Law Journal, Oct. 9. 1995, C6–C22; “Top 25 New York City-Based Firms,” New York Law 
Journal, Dec. 11, 2000, S20; “The NLJ 250,” National Law Journal, Nov. 15, 2004, S16–S27; “Top 25 
New York City-Based Firms,” New York Law Journal, Dec. 13, 2004, 34 (“Growth of New York Law 
Firms”). 
93
 The 1950 numbers are based on Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory (1950). The 1963 and 1981 numbers 
are based on “Growth of 20 Large Law Firms-1963–1981,” New York Law Journal, Mar. 16, 1981, 3. 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, 
Meagher & Flom 
6 10 240 
Cravath, Swaine & Moore 21 124 225 
Fried, Frank, Harris, 
Shriver, & Jacobson 
12 61 222 
Davis, Polk & Wardwell 25 112 221 




Coudert Brothers 14 (+1 tax 
counsel) 
40 218 
Sullivan & Cromwell 24 113 216 
Dewey, Ballantine, 
Bushby, Palmer & Wood 
1694  121 212 













Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & 
Hamilton 
6 (+1 in 
Washington, 
DC office, 




Cahill, Gordon & Reindel 18 88 202 
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, 




White & Case 27 125 189 





Rogers & Wells 1895  62 176 
Cadwalader, Wickersham 
& Taft 
17 70 171 
Stroock & Stroock & 
Lavan 
13 N/A 170 
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, 
Hays & Handler 
18 86 164 
          
        Two general trends taking place post-World War II explain, in part, the rise and 
growth of the Jewish law firms: 1) a gradual decline in anti-Semitism and religious-based 
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 In 1950 Dewey Ballantine was known as Root, Ballantine, Harlan, Bushby & Palmer. The firm had 
sixteen lawyers. 
95
 In 1950, Rogers & Wells was known as Dwight, Royall, Harris, Koegel & Caskey. It  had eighteen 
lawyers. William Rogers joined in 1950. The firm became known as Rogers & Wells in the early 1970s. 
discrimination that made it easier for Jewish law firms to expand their corporate client 
base; and 2) an increased demand for legal services by corporate clients that exceeded the 
capacity of the dominant WASP law firms and opened the door for other law firms, 
including Jewish firms. While generally confirming the existence and consequences of 
these twin trends, the informants' accounts in Parts IV and V shed light on how they 
specifically contributed to and shaped the growth pattern of the Jewish firms.  
 
IV: Diminished Discrimination and its Impact on the Growth of the Jewish Firm 
 
A. Overall Decline in Anti-Semitism and Religious-Based Discrimination 
 
 
       Describing the prevailing discriminatory status quo in America in the years before 
World War II and immediately after it, one informant recalled, “I went to work as an 
engineer for a very brief time and I went to work for [a large engineering company] but 
in those times [late 1940s], they did not hire Jews, and neither did anyone else, 
engineering was not a Jewish profession.”96 When asked about the decline in anti-
Semitism in American society beginning in the 1950s, one informant stated: 
 
Well, it changed; the world changed it in several respects, I guess. People, I think, 
the whole notion of anti-Semitism, of any ethnic discrimination . . . The society has 
really progressed quite dramatically. Discrimination against Jews certainly in the 
eastern part of the United States in major cities was dramatically less. 97  
 
 
        The decline of anti-Semitism and religious-based discrimination was a slow, gradual 
process. Beginning in the 1950s and intensifying in the 1960s, the process reached its 
culmination in the 1970s. One informant described the trend as follows: 
 
Now remember in the late 60's, the world was beginning to open up with the 
Vietnam War and so on, all the prejudices began to disappear, and certainly after 
the Second World War the prejudices began to wear down the dam just broke, 
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 Informant #21, 2. 
 
97
 Informant #5, 12. 
because every institution was questioned. Every institution was questioned and the 
young people, including me were questioning everything. And all the old rules 
began to disappear. And somehow or other Jews began to be able to get into things, 
and we got hired by clients.98  
 
 
Another informant opined, 
 
The 70's was a time where I believe there was great openness generally and people 
understood the need [for diversity,] whether they verbalized it or [not], . . . [and 
that] they were losing out on talent by [not] exposing themselves to various types of 
people. I think there was a general cultural change going on in the United States, 
and I think there was a greater need for lawyers in the 70's and the 80's. That was a 
time of huge growth in the law firms with [greater] need for lawyers, and I think 




       The decline in discrimination, to be sure, centered on ethnic and religious grounds 
and did not extend to the same degree to racial and gender considerations. One informant 
remarked, “I think there is also some change in the country. America generally changed 
in terms of the kinds of discrimination it was willing to practice, putting race aside.”100  
       One informant described how increased religious tolerance altered the practice of law 
and, in particular, courtroom practices: 
 
We were sitting down for the scheduling conference, depositions, Friday meeting or 
something like that and he assigned the schedule and [the federal judge] said, “Oh 
well we can't set that up because you need to leave early on Friday. ” I mean, he 
knew every Jewish holiday, he knew because he had [a Jewish] law clerk and to 
me, in 1960, this was like unbelievable. I had judges who would on a Friday 
afternoon make me sit and wait and not let me go home until 3 o'clock even though 
the case hadn't started, just to sit and wait. An Ita lian judge would say to me, “I 
know when the sun sets!” Like I had to be home when the sun set and ten minutes 
before would [not be a problem]. And one time I remember it was Friday and it was 
Chanukah so you had to get home particularly early because you had to light 
candles before Shabbat. And I said to my client, it was about 3 o'clock “I'm going 
home. Anything happens, you just say ‘he had to leave.’” Today, you go into a 
                                                 
98
 Informant #21, 6.  The same informant further clarified : “Did I say this country has no discrimination 
today? No obviously there still is. There are still places you can't go to play golf, places you can't buy a 
house, but there are many more where you can” (16).  
99
 Informant #6, 10–11. 
100
 Informant #4, 16–17. See Elizabeth Chambliss, “Organizat ional Determinants of Law Firm Integration,” 
American University Law Review 46 (1997): 739–40. Chambliss cautions against the tendency to treat 
women and racial minorities as a single, undifferentiated group. 
judge and there's no issue.101  
 
 
Another informant opined that the slow yet gradual decline of racial-based discrimination 
also benefited Jewish lawyers.102  
       The impact of a decline in anti-Semitism and religious-based discrimination on 
Jewish law firms was significant, making it more likely that corporate clients who 
previously discriminated against Jewish law firms were subsequently more likely to 
retain them. “I think it's a combination [of] two things,” an informant said, speculating 
regarding the willingness of entity clients to hire Jewish firms. “I think it's a combination 
of an overall decline in discrimination [and] a ‘rat race’ for the best lawyers.”103  
 
       Another informant described the combined effect of diminished discrimination and 
increased reliance on merit-considerations: 
 
About 14 years ago my firm was asked to represent a [financial institution] and [a 
Jewish partner with the firm], who was probably the most respected banking lawyer 
in the country was concerned that the client might not know that [he] was Jewish. 
So, he got word to the client, the individual in the institution, that he wanted to 
know that it was all right, or was he disturbed by the fact that he was Jewish, 
because there were many other lawyers there. [The client] had been advised that he 
wanted, that he needed and should have good legal representation. He couldn't get 
better than [the Jewish partner]. That's what he cared about, to be well represented. 
I really think that the focus on the merits of lawyering, [on] a lawyer's abilities has 
overcome these stereotypes and prejudices.104 
 
 
       One informant, explaining the experience of Jewish lawyers at white-shoe firms 
concluded that the success was a symptom of a more general, even generic, phenomenon: 
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 Informant #7, 9–10. 
102
 “Jews had a lot of trouble getting jobs in, I think, the Wall Street firms until the fift ies or sixties. I think 
African American pride and Black independence in the United States and specifically in New York City 
really helped the Jews” (Informant #15, 19). Notably, the belief that the decline of ethno-religious and 
racial discrimination in the 1960s were reinforcing phenomena contrasted with the sentiment of some 
within  the Jewish and Catholic communities fo llowing the Civil War who feared that greater racial equality 
for African-Americans might erode the standing and status of ethno-religious minorit ies. See Jonathan D. 
Sarna, When General Grant Expelled the Jews (New York: Nextbook Schocken, 2012), 24–49. 
103
 Informant #10, 16. 
104
 Informant #12, 24. 
“I think it's a general social change, I mean there were some people who were older 
partners at that time in the 50's who just would not consider the idea of having a Jewish 
partner, and life has changed a lot.”105 To the informant, the key issue was the overall 
decline in anti-Semitism and religious-based discrimination. The success of Jewish 
lawyers and Jewish firms was but the consequence of this general societal trend in the 
legal profession.106  
 
B. The Powerful Interplay of Diminished Discrimination, the Rise of Inside Counsel,  
High Visibility, and the Existence of a Jewish Client Base  
 
 
       The informants suggest that parallel developments within the legal profession 
magnified the impact of decreased discrimination, making it even more likely that 
corporate clients would retain Jewish law firms. The first trend was the rise of inside 
counsel, and more specifically, the shift in decision-making authority within corporate 
clients over the engagement of outside counsel from discriminating non- lawyer 
executives to inside counsel.107 For example, one informant recalled: 
 
I was picked up by [a large corporation] and the General Counsel for [that large 
corporation]. He saw me and formed an attachment to me. He saw all the lecturing 
and the work I had been doing, and being retained by [that large corporation] 
brought me into the world of [large entity in another industry] and [large 
corporation in a third industry] because they were all working together on 
legislative issues. [When] they brought me in as their counsel . . . I was really in the 
world of the [general counsels] of . . . [these three corporations] . . .  And the 
relationships and the networking just began to expand and expand. And before I 
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knew it I was representing [multiple large corporate entities] . . . I just happened to 
be a good lawyer, and I was doing good work. I got hired by [a fourth corporate 
client] because they were in a case with [the large corporation who was already a 
client] and they were going to get into trouble. They saw what I did and they came 
in and hired me. It was that kind of networking and knowing. And, by the way, 
around this time, the general counsel began to have a much greater role in hiring 
outside lawyers. And somehow or another, that too helped break the barrier, 
because the chairman of the board and the CEO didn't hire any more at country 
clubs. He turned to his general counsel and said, “Get me the best lawyer you can,” 
and if you [were an] outstanding lawyer in the 60's and the 70's and into the 80's, 
you got hired.108  
 
 
       Another informant explained that, while breaking down anti-Semitism was more 
difficult in the corporate world, inside counsel helped sever the long-standing ties 
between corporate clients and their WASP firms.109 
        The second trend, which helped inside counsel to make the decision to hire Jewish 
firms, was the high visibility of the practice of the Jewish firms and their prominent 
attorneys. This trend also benefited from diminished discrimination. As one informant 
put it: 
 
Law, I think, was easier and medicine was easier, because once we became visible, 
once we were capable of making ourselves visible, it became clear that we were 
pretty good. And then one thing leads to another. I think law and medicine are kind 
of unique because they are individual and you can make a reputation for yourself. 
You can make a reputation climbing up the ladder in the world of the circumscribed 
corporation but law, it seems to me, is a more open profession. You have more 
capacity to be seen in law and medicine than you do in management. If you want a 
career, you need to be seen so I think visibility is critical. 110  
 
 
       The informants suggest that Jewish law firms displayed their superstar power at a 
                                                 
108
 Informant #21, 6–7. 
109
 Informant #10, 9–10. Another informant noted: “And that was true of a whole range of firms. It was 
referred to then as client loyalty. Unless you really screwed up, there was a tendency not to move around. 
Starting in about the 1980s that changed. First, in financial institutions and then moved over to a whole 
bunch of others and now there is no such channel anymore” (Informant #22, 12). On the transformation of 
the attorney-client relationship between large law firms and entity clients and the shift from stable long -
term and loyal affiliat ions to shorter competitive relationships see David B. W ilkins, “Team of Rivals? 
Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship,” Fordham Law Review 78 (2010): 
2067–2136. 
110
 Informant #21, 17, 18–19. On the ro le of visibility within and outside large law firms in informing 
lawyers’ professional success see Eli Wald, “The Visib ility of Socioeconomic Status and Class -Based 
Affirmative Action: A Reply to Professor Sander,” Denver University Law Review 88 (2011): 861–88.  
very opportune time; they began rising after 1945 and achieved prominence by the late 
1970s and early 80s. This was the period before continued institutionalization of the large 
firms rendered personal, individual visibility less apparent and anonymity became the 
norm of large firm practice. “With increasing specialization and division of labor in the 
blue-chip bar,” said a commentator, “the individual lawyer . . . has no opportunity to 
stand out. The firms become the powers, not the men in them . . . In short, the blue-chip 
bar has become a place for a man to make money, not to make his mark.”111 This legal 
environment was quite different from that of the early 1950s and 1960s, when attorneys 
such as Milton Handler of Kaye, Scholer, Ira Millstein of Weil, Gotshal, Marty Lipton of 
Wachtell, Lipton, and Joe Flom of Skadden, Arps rose to prominence and lent their 
highly visible careers to their Jewish law firms. 112 In those early days of high visibility, 
success in one major case could mean a ticket out of low status and an opportunity to 
establish a large corporate client base.113  
       Finally, the interplay of diminished discrimination, the rise of inside counsel, and the 
high visibility of the work of prominent attorneys at Jewish firms was particularly 
important to the growth of Jewish law firms and to their development of a large corporate 
client base because initially Jewish law firms did not represent large entities, or even 
large Jewish entities. For example, as one informant recollected: “XXX was a Jewish 
firm. Its client base consisted of mostly Jewish clients, [but] it generally did not represent 
industry leaders. Instead of representing the first or second largest garment maker, it 
typically represented the third biggest. The firm's client base changed in the 1970s 
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[when] New York City became about merit . . . The decline of the importance of old style 
relationships was a big deal, replaced by merit representations.”114 Indeed, one informant 
at a large Jewish firm, describing the firm's clientele in the late 1960s, explained that 
while “many of our clients were Jewish,” the firm had hardly any Fortune 500 clients.115 
Another informant affirmed, “Interestingly enough, for the so-called gentile law firms, in 
many cases, the principal business was with the Jewish banks. The [large] Jewish law 
firms weren't representing [large] Jewish corporations.”116 One informant added: 
 
Now, why did [Jewish clients] go to these big [WASP] law firms? Because people  
wanted  . . . their businesses. They thought they needed a fancy bank; they thought 
they needed a fancy lawyer. They can be impressed with them [the WASP firms] . . 
. I'm serious. I was angry about it.117  
 
 
These circumstances were echoed by another informant:  
 
When [Jewish] clients started coming in from Brooklyn, somebody once 
mentioned to me, “Why don't we open up an office in Brooklyn?” So, I told him, 
“I feel that anybody that can afford our rates wants to come to a Manhattan 
lawyer; they don't want to stay in Brooklyn.” That's true.118  
 
 
       One informant recalled his frustration with observant Jewish clients taking their 
business to non-Jewish or to secular Jewish firms: 
 
I used to walk around almost resentful when I would see the Hasidic and obviously 
Orthodox people sitting in offices of lawyers. Well, why weren't they coming to 
me? I understand them, I know the culture. But no, that wasn't the issue. The issue 
was they wanted successful lawyers and the lawyers had no problem dealing with 
them. I think in the fifties I would have been embarrassed to bring one of them to 
my office.119 
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       To the extent that Jewish law firms did benefit from the existence of a Jewish client 
base, the informants point out that rather than representing large Jewish clients, the 
Jewish firms relied on a large number of smaller entity Jewish clients. One informant 
described the client base of his law firm as mostly Jewish: “I think the large number were 
Jewish, with some exceptions. A lot of the real-estate people were . . . Jewish clients. . . . 
Today, you couldn't tell.”120 Another informant described the development of his 
expertise as a function of the large number of small corporate clients represented by his 
firm: 
 
The [Jewish] firm I joined was basically a corporate law firm. That's what we did, 
and when I joined it, unlike today, there weren't many defined departments. Maybe 
there was a tax department, but beside that the young lawyers were assigned on an 
occasional basis to whomever needed help and so my early practice experience was 
exposure to a very diverse area. It involved lending and borrowing transactions, 
investment transactions, a lot of small private corporations and organizational 
development, bankruptcy, litigation, contracts. I mean you worked for a partner and 
then you went to another partner. That is, there were no assignments so I was 
luckier than people are today because I had very broad exposure to a wide variety of 
things and circumstances. I developed [expertise] mostly in corporate, in corporate 
finance and the securities area and I got involved in public offerings and everything 
having to do with stocks and bonds.121  
 
 
The experience was shared by the following informant: 
 
I came here [to a Jewish firm], I worked for I would say five years, doing 




       Moreover, the informants suggest that not only did large entity Jewish clients fail to 
patronize the large Jewish firms, they also failed to use their influence to advocate for 
increased diversity within their WASP law firms. Said one informant, “I have not 
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perceived the entree of Jewish lawyers coming as a result of demands from Jewish 
clients.”123 And another remarked: 
 
I am not aware that . . . in the 70's clients were saying, “We want to make sure that 
we have a Jewish lawyer [as] opposed to a non-Jewish lawyer,” or [asking that 
firms be] more diverse . . . . From my perspective, I don't know if that is correct. . . . 
[My] sense at the time was not that clients wanted more diversity.124  
 
 
       Drawing a distinction between the conduct of large Jewish clients in the past and 
contemporary corporate calls for increased diversity, one informant noted: 
 
Very prominent investment firms had all of their personal business done by a 
Jewish law firm. But their public business was done by a non-Jewish firm. They 
made no effort whatsoever to encourage the non-Jewish firm to hire Jews. 
However, once [Jewish attorneys] started to show up at [white-shoe firms], they did 
feel a little more comfortable about that. But these [Jews at investment firms] were 
the German Jewish people exercising their patrimonial rights [with regard to the 
Jewish attorneys at white-shoe firms]. But I would not credit that point in history 
any very serious attempt by them to influence the hiring or retention of people. I 
wouldn't credit it all. Never saw it [referring to “A Call to Action,” a demand by 
large corporations for greater diversity at large law firms125]. . . . That is an example 
of strong arming I have never seen before. But it is the kind of strong arming that is 
going on now days. Nowadays it is acceptable. If it existed in earlier years, it was a 
hell of a lot [more] subtle.126  
 
 
V. Increased Client Demand for Corporate Legal Services and the Growth of The Jewish 
Firm 
 
A. The Growth of Business Law and Increased Demand for Corporate Legal Services  
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       The growth of the large law firm is explained by a complex mix of demand and 
supply considerations.127 Increased demand for corporate legal services128 explains in part 
the rise and growth of large firms. Indeed, the Cravath blueprint for the organization of 
the large law firm was, in part, an institutional response on the supply side to the 
demands of large corporate clients. “It is well known that the large law firm was born . . . 
in a period of institutional reorganization dominated by the rise of the giant business 
corporation.”129 Thus, the rise of large law firms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries was in response to the growing needs of big corporate clients.130  
       After 1950, increased demand for legal services explains the growth of WASP and 
Jewish law firms alike. The increase in corporate demand for legal services has been both 
quantitative and qualitative. Significant growth in the body and scope of statutory and 
administrative laws regulating the conduct of entity clients shaped the legal needs of 
large corporate clients and called for a corresponding growth in the size and expertise of 
the large law firms.131 Nelson argues that increased government regulation of business, 
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cost deals,132 “reflects growing demand for corporate legal services of a type big firms 
offer.”133 In addition, Nelson asserts that restructuring in the market for corporate legal 
services further contributes to large firm growth: the shift from continuous, general 
service relationships between corporate clients and law firms led to firm growth based on 
highly specialized, often isolated, transactions and lawsuits.134 Further, “the breakdown 
of stable regional markets for law firms created a national market in corporate legal 
services that was unprecedented. The leading firms in New York City and in other major 
legal centers openly competed for the most lucrative client relationships and projects.”135  
       Jewish law firms were able to take advantage of increased demand for corporate 
legal services because the dominant WASP corporate bar was fairly small in terms of the 
absolute number of large firms and their size, as well as in terms of the relative number 
needed to deal with the increased client demand for corporate legal services.136 
Consequently, after 1945, Jewish firms gained ground on the WASP firms in a relatively 
short time span. If the WASP firms had been either more numerous or bigger in size, 
perhaps they would have been better positioned to meet the growing needs of corporate 
clients and would have crowded out the Jewish firms. But their relative ly small number 
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and size did not allow them to eliminate the competition. While the WASP firms grew 
rapidly and consistently both before and after 1945, 137 their growth after 1945 could not 
satisfy the even greater growing client demand for corporate legal services. 138  
 




       The increased demand for corporate legal services, which led to the growth of the 
WASP firms in the first half of the twentieth century, contributed to the rise and growth 
of the Jewish law firms after WWII. In addition, it led to a significant change in the 
hiring and promotion practices of the large firms. The WASP law firms could not satisfy 
their increased need for associates from within the ranks of WASP associates. They 
began, gradually and hesitantly, to hire and eventually promote Jewish lawyers. One 
informant affirmed this trend, stating: 
 
As the . . . law business grew, the firms grew, [and] the need for high quality 
lawyering grew, meaning a) the growth of business, b) the growth of business 
regulation and the increasing need for lawyers, the need to give both legal and 
ethical advice to keep these corporations out of trouble. . . . These law firms needed 
people, and they couldn't afford to discriminate. Discrimination became a negative 
business plan—they were shooting themselves in the foot because they had to reject 
superior lawyers to hire ethnically acceptable inferior lawyers. . . . [It's] true 
whether you're discriminating against Jews, . . . Catholics, . . . Asians, . . . Blacks, 
or . . . anybody. Any time you discriminate, you take some guy who's not as good 
over the person you're discriminating against, so as a business proposition. . . . I 
think those are two factors that changed the world. 139   
 
  
Another informant argued: 
 
What changed? Brain-power needs. The complexity of the world became so great—
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an explosion in the marketplace, globalization, the growth of the economy. . . . The 
coverage is so big that you need manpower. . . . So, you want to hire. You use them 
all up, and you need talent, too. So, Harvard has 500 students and 250 are WASPs. 
[All of the WASPs] get jobs, [and] there is [sic] still plenty of jobs for the other 250 
Jews. So, the growth in the economy created a demand. They need more manpower. 
They need more bodies and they need some talent . . . so . . . they need the Jews. 
My view is as simple as that. It's the law of supply and demand. 140  
 
And a third informant added: 
 
I think that [the decline of discrimination against Jewish lawyers was] tie[d]  into the 
commercialization of the practice of law. And whether it's corporations or law 
firms, we're looking simply for merit and for talent, so, [the] old school 
[discriminatory hiring practices of] the firms in the teens, 20's and 30's wouldn't 
work anymore.141  
 
 
       The informants' accounts, however, caution against too-quickly accepting the theory 
that competition leads to the decline of discrimination, as is evidenced in the following:  
 
The firms ultimately had to take in Jewish people because they grew so quickly. 
But my friend . . . in my class tells the story of going to a WASP firm [that was] 
well known, and being shown around the conference room. They had medallions 
from the various law schools, including Yale [whose seal includes several Hebrew 
letters]. And one fellow there who did the interview . . . asked what ethnicity [my 
friend] was. He said, “Czechoslovakian or what?” He said, “Can you read this?” 
[referring to the Hebrew letters in Yale's seal]. So, there were relatively few Jews 
who were being taken and that had to change because of the explosions in the law 
firms and the demand for . . . smart lawyers. And if you were looking for smarts, 
Jews had the big capital among them.142  
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        Another informant pointed out that, while increased client demand was a key factor 
causing both the growth of large firms and the decline of discrimination, the decline was 
gradual and slow and took over twenty years to develop into the norm, and added, “I 
believe in the 70's in some of the non-Jewish firms, they would have had more difficulty 
accommodating for their needs.”143  
       A time-consuming, gradual change in the hiring and promotion practices of the 
WASP firms meant that many Jewish lawyers in this “transition” period did not succeed 
in securing a job and struggled to survive professionally. For many lawyers who had been 
the objects of discrimination, the change came too late.  The following account makes 
explicit the consequence of a prolonged decline in discrimination: 
 
My first job [was with] a firm called Gold & Bach & Burrell, a small firm [of] 
about 10 or 11 lawyers. Jeff Gold graduated [from] Yale in 1941, first in his class, 
then he started his own practice; Marty Burrell [graduated from] Harvard [with a 
joint] M.B.A. & J.D in those days it took some doing . . . The firm eventually went 
bankrupt, as did many of the firms, and I got fired my first year. I wanted to be a 
corporate lawyer, and I thought it might be a bit different . . . Then I went to work 
in a storefront in Brooklyn where I eked out a living doing wills and house closings, 
making $5,000 a year, [and] moved to Court Street in Brooklyn. Then I got a break, 
I went into the legislature. I rose to the position of chief counsel for the speaker of 
the New York City senate. . . . I met a friend of mine who was a member of this 
firm. And twenty-five years ago, I joined this firm and, little by little, I gradually 
moved up to Senior Partner.144  
 
 
No doubt, diminished anti-Semitism and increased demand for corporate legal services 
“generically” explain the rise and growth of the Jewish law firms. 145 Indeed, the latter 
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provides a general explanation for the growth of all large law firms, including the old 
WASP firms, rather than an account of the unique, faster growth of the Jewish firms. The 
informants suggest, however, that the rise of the Jewish law firm was not generic. Rather, 
it was also explained by the conduct and practices of the WASP firms.  
 
VI. The Unique Growth of the Jewish Law Firm 
 
A. White-Shoe Ethos and Protected Pockets of “Jewish” Practice Areas 
 
 
       The large WASP firms stayed clear of what they perceived to be “undignified” 
practice areas, inconsistent with their white-shoe ethos and notions of professionalism, 
such as real-estate, hostile takeover work, bankruptcy, and litigation.146 As one informant 
put it, “In the 1950s Jews were restricted to Jewish firms and Jewish practice areas.”147 
Another remarked: 
 
[A particular attorney] was a real-estate lawyer and litigator and a real-estate 
investor—a very wealthy man. . . . And, as you probably know, at the time, the 
largest firms at the time really had no real-estate partners. . . . That's not the case 
today. . . . Real-estate, like divorce, was viewed as dirty work. And WASP lawyers 
didn't get involved in real-estate . . . until they saw there was something worth 
happening in the area. So, this fellow was involved in a variety of developments, 
real-estate developments and otherwise.148  
 
 
This division is emphasized by another informant: 
 
The specialization or over-specialization that we have now didn't exist then . . . 
Real-estate was not a big thing in those days. . . . It was almost [unheard of] for the 
large firms to have a real-estate department, and now that's a big thing . . . and 
bankruptcy is big; when I say that I mean, what I'm trying to say, is that those 
specialties in the old days were little firms that did only that—you had a bankruptcy 
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firm, you had a real-estate firm. . . . There is much more specialization now. 149  
 
 
       This conduct by the WASP firms created pockets of practice that Jewish law firms 
occupied and promptly came to dominate. In the hostile takeover market, for example, 
Skadden, Arps and Wachtell, Lipton took advantage of the reluctance of the white-shoe 
firms to get involved in a less than dignified practice and in the mid 1970s monopolized 
this “Jewish pocket.” A commentator said of the monopoly: 
 
Either because they're still snobby about such fighting, or because Flom and Lipton 
have such a head start on them in experience and reputation, the old- line law firms 
are still only rarely involved in tender fights. Usually, when a fight starts, a 
company whom they represent as general counsel brushes them aside because the 
investment bankers they're using have told them to get Flom or Lipton. 150 
 
 
       Consequently, Skadden, Arps and Wachtell, Lipton were able to monopolize the 
hostile takeover pocket of practice: 
 
There is probably no other major area of law where so small a group of attorneys, 
and one attorney in particular, enjoys such total domination. . . . Flom today enjoys 
unprecedented pre-eminence in the field. My count has him on one side or the 
other, or working for the investment bankers, in ninety percent of the tender fights 
of the last three years. Lipton is the only lawyer who seems to share even a portion 
of the field with him.151  
 
 
       Bankruptcy law was another example of an “undignified,” Jewish practice area. One 
informant remembered: 
 
Years ago it was like bankruptcy because they were collection lawyers. It was like a 
primate part of the Bar, you weren't proud to be a collection lawyer and do 




       Another informant described how practicing in this protected pocket of practice 
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allowed his firm to develop expertise and build its reputation: 
 
We acted in the XXX Bankruptcy, which, up to that point was the largest 
bankruptcy that had taken place in the US. And [a partner with the firm] headed the 
effort on that. It turned out to be a very successful liquidation and established our 
reputation as creditor's rights lawyers with the major banks. Also in [the same year], 
we represented [a large corporation] which was on the brink of bankruptcy. We 
acted as counsel to [that corporation] in working out an agreement with banks and 
[other parties] to solve its fiscal crisis. That too was a matter of considerable 
notoriety particularly in the banking world and on Wall Street. So that [a few years 
later], we had an established reputation for corporate merger/acquisition/take over 
matters, major creditor's rights problems, financial issues. 153  
 
 
       As one informant revealed, the Jewish pockets of practice allowed Jewish firms to 
establish and develop a loyal client base, with little competition from the WASP firms: 
 
We had a family; I've known that family for probably . . . forty-five years, through 
thick and through thin, through marriages through divorces, etc. . . .  They had to do 
major estate planning, and I am totally capable of that. . . . I introduced them to the 
person here that does that, and they put in a lot of time and effort . . . The person 
that did the estate planning [later] left the firm and took with him the list of clients 
he worked with . . . He wrote each of them a . . . nice form letter, saying, “If you 
have any interest in your relationship, here's a release” . . . and this guy sent back a 
little note that said, “[the informant] has been my lawyer for forty years [and] I'm 
not changing now.”154  
 
 
       Building on client relationships within the Jewish pockets and establishing their 
expertise and reputation, the Jewish firms were gradually able to cross over and represent 
the same clients outside of the “undignified” arenas in “respectable” corporate affairs. 
One informant described the transformation and expansion of the firm's client base: 
 
In those days bankruptcy was not such a respectable practice but it smelled to me 
like a big firm going into bankruptcy may just fit in one of these days and the rest is 
history, because in the 70's, the real industry started to boom and here we were and 
that practice just took off, the firm really took off, and of course it grew in other 
areas too.155  
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Another informant similarly noted: 
 
In 1969, we represented [a large corporation] in a merger with [another large 
corporate entity]. That transaction ended up with two relationships that became very 
important. We met [a banker at a large investment bank] in that transaction and he 
liked the work that we did and as a result of that we began to do a fair a mount of 
work for [the investment bank], which was one of the leading investment banks. 
And the company that acquired [our 1969 corporate client] liked what we did and 
we began to do a significant amount of legal work for [the acquiring entity] which 
was a major step forward in that we were now representing a leading Wall Street 
investment bank and one of the country's largest corporations. Both were very 
active clients.156  
 
 
       Several years later, a successful representation of one corporate client in conjunction 
with a takeover attempt saw the client base of the firm grow from one major client, to 
several clients the following year, to several hundred clients a decade later.157 
Importantly, the firm was able to expand its practice and client base beyond the protected 
practice areas into mainstream corporate practice, so much so that the informant revealed 
that “[Today] we're fairly active in what I call the corporate governance area, advising 
companies as to how to structure their board processes and corporate governance 
guidelines and so on which has become a major part of our practice.”158 
       While the WASP firms were willing to concede “dirty” law practice to the Jewish 
firms, they were unable to contain the areas of concession. The Jewish firms crossed over 
to the “dignified” practice areas, as is noted in the following: 
 
When the tender-offer boom began a few years ago, Flom became a hot 
commodity, not only to raiders but to the more established target companies who 
decided they'd rather have him defending them than attacking them. As late as 
1970, Skadden, Arps had 29 lawyers.   . . . Now the firm has ninety. . . . This 
skyrocketing growth dwarfs the much slower expansion of the old, white-shoe firms 
on Wall Street. . . . Joe's done the most magnificent thing anyone's ever done i[n] 
the law business. . . . He's broken the link between the old investment-banking firms 
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and blue-chip companies and their Wall Street lawyers.159  
 
 
       Moreover, white-shoe ethos not only restricted the growth of WASP firms in terms 
of practice areas, but also limited their growth in terms of lateral hiring, which was 
considered rude and unprofessional.160 As one informant recalled: 
 
After I'd been [in public service] for five years, I decided I wanted to go back to 
private practice and I wanted to return to New York I remember looking through 
the New York Martindale-Hubbell trying to see if there was any firm there that 
appealed to me and I came to the conclusion that there wasn't. You know there were 
certain firms that are famous never taking in people that are laterals. In more recent 
years there have been a few exceptions to that, but basically you know the major 
firms at that level didn't take in laterals. So it wasn't so hard to exclude those firms. 
The only firm I went to made me an offer, promised a partnership. [It was] still very 
definitely a Jewish firm with these two Catholic partners. 161  
 
 
       The Jewish firms, on the other hand, uninhibited by the weight of white-shoe culture, 
were aggressive in recruiting laterally. One informant described such hiring patterns at 
his firm: 
 
We do a lot of lateral hiring. And, if you look at the economics of it, assuming that 
you take in thirty or forty kids, how many of them are going to become partners? . . 
. I mean, economics doesn't permit it, which means you have to get rid of people 
along the way. And . . . you have to fill in the gaps at some point. And so you bring 
people in, while you're getting rid of people. It's a strange dynamic, but it exists. So, 
we do a great deal of that and more.162 
 
 
Another informant recalled his personal experience when he was laterally cherry-picked 
to lead the corporate department of a large Jewish firm: 
 
About twenty-five years ago, in 1981, after eighteen years [elsewhere, with another 
Jewish firm, which was also growing] I joined [a different large Jewish firm] as 
head of the corporate department. . . . We hired nine people . . . and they were really 
first rate people. . . . We had people from many different firms. . . . and one of the 
                                                 
159
 Brill, “Two Tough Lawyers in the Tender Offer Game,”  54. 
160
 Fern S. Sussman, “The Large Law Firm Structure: An Historic Opportunity,” Fordham Law Review 57 
(1989): 969. 
161
 Informant # 11, 7–8. 
162
 Informant #1, 10. 
partners came with me and is with me still, and an associate came with me and 
eventually became a partner and subsequently led the real-estate department. Also 
[having] join[ed] was the head of our corporate department.163 
 
 
       The contrast between the aggressive recruiting practices of the Jewish firms and the 
more passive practices of the WASP firms, as well as their consequences in terms of 
lateral recruitment and retaining talent, are captured in the following account of one 
informant: 
 
I think one or two people left, and [a small Jewish firm I was with before being 
recalled into the army] called and asked me to come down and talk to them, which I 
did, and they said, “We would like you to come back. We're sorry you left us; it's a 
year or two later, but we'd like you to come back.” And they made me a very 
substantial salary offer, which was substantially more than I was making [at the 
new firm], and I was making twenty-five percent more than I had been making 
there when I left. . . . Now, we're talking early 1960s, so $12,000 a year was a lot of 
money, and I think I was making $12,000 here and they offered me $16,000 or 
$18,000, which was a stupendous amount of money, and I told them I really was 
very comfortable here, that I really like[d] the people here [and] I liked what I was 
doing. I had a career here, and I was staying.164 
 
 
B. Effective Discrimination by the WASP Firms and its Consequences: The Creation of a 




       In the 1950s and 1960s, WASP law firms effectively discriminated against Jewish 
lawyers.165 According to one informant, “There's no question that in 1955 the major New 
York law firms were not hiring Jews.”166 Echoing the same sentiment, another informant 
remembered, “I was at the top of the class and very high ranked student. I started 
interviewing in the downtown law firms, not a chance. There was no way that a Jewish, a 
young Jewish lawyer was going to get accepted into the big firms. It just wasn't going to 
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happen.”167 A third informant noted, “When I came down to look for a job in 1953 there 
weren't too many Jews being hired so, it was just beginning. There were then some firms 
that had no Jews, some major law firms that had some Jews and unless it was a Jewish 
firm even the ones that had some Jews didn't have many.”168  
       The realities of discriminatory practice were clearly perceived by Jewish attorneys. 
“I suppose it was just generally assumed that Jewish people, or Jewish boys—it was all 
boys then—wouldn't go to a Sullivan & Cromwell or something else like that,” recalled 
one informant. “There certainly was discrimination . . . so that is all true.”169 One of the 
informants added: 
 
In the fall of 1953, a number of members of my class were elected to the board of 
editors. And that also coincided with our looking for jobs for the summer of 1954. 
If you looked at the board of the Columbia Law Review from the class of ‘54, ‘55 
there was a very, very significant Jewish population on that board so going back to 
the attitudes of myself and my colleagues in the fall of ‘53, then there were Jewish 
firms [like] Proskauer, Strauss and Spiegelberg, although frankly, I was unaware of 
that firm at that time, and I don't know anyone in my class who went to that firm. 
And there was one firm which was regarded as egalitarian and that was Paul Weiss 
which had Jewish partners, Catholic partners, and Gentile partners and even the 
occasional black associate. Many people in my class had a lot of trouble getting 
summer jobs. I don't know what the percentages were but [I have a] clear memory 
of how discouraged many people were going through the interview process over 
and over again and not getting any offers. So you know at the end of the summer of 
1954, we entered our third year in law school. And except for people who had 
offers from the summer everybody went through the same process all over again, 
and also I have the same memory of how discouraged people were. 170  
 
The same frustration was expressed by another informant: 
 
This would have been early ‘58, the downtown white-shoe firms were simply not 
really hiring Jews as they do now. . . . Certainly, the discrimination was evident to 
me when I was at . . . law school, and none of us had any doubt that it was there. I 
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mean, we all talked about it, and we recognized it and deplored it. 171  
 
 
       By effective discrimination, I do not mean to suggest that no Jewish lawyers were 
hired by the WASP firms. For example, one informant noted: 
 
I had, as I started to look in the job market in 1955, had mentally thought that there 
were two problems I faced. One, [my law school] was not ranked with Harvard or 
Columbia, and secondly because I am Jewish, and not the least hesitant to say so I 
thought that I was relegated to firms that were not of size or substance, and in point 
of fact I literally stumbled into the offices of [a large white-shoe firm]. Literally 
stumbled in without an appointment, without prearranged anything and asked for an 
interview. At the end of the very first interview, I had a job offer, but was told that I 
had to come back for a second round. So I came back for the second round, had the 
offer and was accepted on the spot . . . But it was my impression that life being 
what it was, my destiny was to be in one of the smaller firms. To my surprise, [a 
large white-shoe firm], which had no Jewish partners [extended me an offer].172  
 
 
       Another informant described his experience interviewing at a large white-shoe firm: 
 
Then in my second year I decided I should try New York . . . [a mixed firm] was 
clearly the place I sort of wanted to go . . . I went to [a white-shoe firm] [because] I 
figured I really would not care for it, and so it would be a good sort of stress 
interview for me, good thing to subject myself to. And I actually interviewed there 
first. . . . So, I go [to the white-shoe firm] first and am interviewed by a man. He 
was so different than my expectations, that I was just you know . . . I left the office 
and my expectations were . . . I went to [the mixed firm] . . . Somebody there at 
some point suggested that it was a strike against me that I wasn't on the law review. 
They sort of didn't care for that. By the way, I have many friends there. I respect the 
firm immensely . . . So, I just sat there not knowing what the hell to do, and I 
decided finally to go with my heart, and I went with [the white-shoe firm]. I 
enjoyed the summer and came back and stayed. That's the law firm choice. 173 
 
 
       Rather, my aim is to convey a professional reality whereby discrimination was the 
norm at WASP law firms. This discrimination was indicated by the following informants' 
accounts: 
 
[I] found a job here. And this was a very small firm at the time. It was a 
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predominantly Jewish firm because, even in those days, it wasn't easy for Jews to 
break into the large law firms. Although, some of the major firms did have Jewish 
partners. White & Case had one and Sullivan & Cromwell had a couple. But, it was 
not the norm.174 
 
Absolutely—there's no question about that now—I cannot give you statistics, [and] 
I'm sure some of these “pubas” would argue with me, but I was there. I saw it 
happen. The major firms who were known as the white-shoe firms—the Gentile 
firms—they hired Jews, but very few. In no way did they hire Jews in proportion to 
the number of Jews that were at the top of their class and were successful in law 
school—that simply didn't happen.175  
 
 
       In addition, WASP firms that did hire Jewish attorneys as associates tended not to 
promote them to partnership.176 Tellingly, one informant recalled: 
 
I went back to [a large white-shoe firm after a couple of years in public service], 
and was told that I would have to take my place in line as one option. The other 
option was to try to get a partnership in [another] firm. I had those offers at  the 
time. [A large Jewish firm] was one of the firms that offered me a partnership. 
Looking at the opportunities, and even at that point of time—now this in 1968—I 
had a considerable concern about what the opportunities were for Jews in the field, 
and opted for [the large Jewish firm] to get that issue out of the way. 177  
 
 
Another informant similarly noted, “At the time, we [at a large white-shoe firm] had a lot 
of associates who were Jewish, probably not in the same proportion as now, but . . . 
many. [There were] many senior associates, but none of them stayed, and none of them 
made partner.”178  
       Importantly, whereas in the decades preceding World War II, elite colleges and law 
schools discriminated against Jewish students by imposing admission quotas,179 
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beginning in the late 1940s and throughout the 1960s, a growing number of Jewish 
attorneys were top graduates and editors of the Law Review at elite law schools. 180 As 
one informant remembered: 
 
What was happening in the early 50's was the opportunity to get into a really top 
flight law school as graduates of the Hebrew College . . . There had been a few 
exceptions [Jewish graduates of Hebrew College who were admitted to elite law 
schools before the 1950s] . . . Suddenly, in our time in 1954 and 1955, the [elite] 
law school opened up at Harvard for whatever reason. Generally Hebrew College 
graduates had done very well in graduate school and they gave the school a very 
much-deserved reputation. And so it was like, “Hey, you know you could really go 
to a good law school.” And I think that was the attraction for me . . . and now it 
seemed like even guys like me could get in.181  
 
 
       Still, many Jewish graduates of elite law schools could not find a job with the white-
shoe firms. The informants affirmed this fact in the following accounts: 
 
Because, no, you got into law school and the minorities did well, the Jewish 
students did well . . . [but] they still couldn't get jobs. It wasn't the law school, so it 
had to be some other thing . . . The Jewish kids at the top of the class had a tougher 
time . . . with the white-shoe law firms.182  
 
Getting a job was impossible. It was impossible because the law firms that hired 
law students were all—with the exception of a couple, which I will tell you about—
blatantly anti-Semitic. . . . They posted—and I remember to this day—on the 
bulletin board of the Yale Law School—this great liberal bastion of universal love 
of all creeds—the interviews that were to be given at the Yale Law School campus. 
Fifty percent of the law school was Jewish, [and] not one single Jewish name—not 
one single—[was posted], including the editor- in-chief of the Yale Law Journal . . . 
or . . . the man who was first in his class . . . I complained, so they took this list and 
they went to the Hotel Taft in New Haven, and they interviewed them down there. 
A Sabbath[-]observing Jew is like having cancer on top of AIDS—useless. The law 
firms that hire[d] were few in number.183  
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Graduating Law School in 1958 was tough times for jobs generally . . . I don't think  
I encountered the normal discrimination so to speak because I don't think I had even 
attempted to get into the white-shoe firms . . . So there were plenty of firms to go to 
that you didn't have to try to break into where you were not wanted. 184  
 
 
As a result of these discriminatory hiring and promoting practices, Jewish attorneys 
tended to flock to the Jewish law firms, sometimes self-selecting out of even applying for 
a position with the WASP firms. “I wouldn't interview [with] those [WASP] firms,” said 
one informant.185 And another noted, “I think many of them practiced discrimination not 
even realizing it was discrimination; plus the fact that there's also self-discrimination 
where people don't apply there because they . . . don't want to be rejected.”186 
       The deeper roots of self-selection were described as follows by an informant who 
interviewed with WASP firms, but ended up accepting an offer from a Jewish firm: 
 
And then there is reverse discrimination . . . I did not do much interviewing [with 
WASP firms,] but I do remember . . . several years later I met somebody at [a 
WASP firm] and he said to me, “[W]hy didn't you respond to our offer?” I said 
“what [offer]?” He said, “We telephoned your home, and I think we spoke to your 
mother, and we made you an offer. We asked you to call; you never called back.” 
So I said, “I didn't call back because I didn't know that it happened.” So, at an 
appropriate time, I said to my mother, “Mother, do you remember getting a call 
from [the WASP firm] offering me a job?” She said, “yes.” “How come you didn't 
                                                                                                                                                 
related job while attending college: 
Nobody had better credentials than me. I was chief editor of the high school newspaper. Nobody 
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tell me about it?” [I asked]. She said, “Well, you already had a job offer from a firm 
that was very.” She wouldn't have used this word—“egalitarian”—I don't know 
what word she used. She said, “And I thought it was a good firm, and I didn't see 
any reason why you should consider an offer from a Gentile firm.” So, the point I'm 
trying to make . . . is that it worked both ways.187 
 
 
        Another informant commented about the disapproval of his classmates upon 
learning of his decision to join a white-shoe firm: 
 
I remember when I went to [a white-shoe firm] for the summer and came back from 
the summer, then when I announced I was going to go back there after graduation, a 
number of my classmates, particularly Jewish classmates, made it clear that they 
disapproved of my decision. I don't want to say made it clear, there are various 
ways of making things clear and it just infuriated me that they were drawing upon 
these stereotypes that get to them and they obviously did, because they are so fixed. 
[Stereotypes] count, they matter . . . There's no question that a stereotype was 
present. Then it subsisted for a while. I do think it isn't there today, but I could be 
wrong. It just really got me pretty upset, mostly disappointed in the people who 
otherwise, had good judgment.188  
 
 
       The effective discrimination by the WASP firms resulted in the creation of a large 
pool of highly qualified attorneys from which the Jewish firms could pick and choose 
elite talent at their discretion. A partner at a Jewish firm recalled, “We hired nine people, 
of which six had continued into federal clerkships. And they were really scholastically 
outstanding: we had several editors and editors- in-chief who were authors of the Harvard 
Law Review . . . They were really first rate people.”189 One informant concluded, “the 
Jewish firms' edge was that they were getting the Jewish students at a period when the 
non-Jewish firms were actually not hiring,”190 and another opined that [Jewish firms] 
“benefited from discrimination, [we] recruited a lot of Jewish attorneys.”191 A third 
informant noted: 
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In terms of recruitment I perceived there was, still at that point of time, this is now 
1967, 1968, 1969, to 1970, a divide. That younger people who aspired to achieve,  
who were of the Jewish faith, had less opportunity, except in targeted areas, or 
targeted firms like [a large Jewish firm], to grow, whereas, non-Jews had no 
problems. So the opportunity was to get really talented people from that market, 
and later on from that market of women lawyers trying to achieve who likewise had 
the same barrier and so we pushed actively in those two areas because the chances 
of getting a well qualified Law Review graduates in one or another of those markets 
was greater than getting somebody who was not Jewish because he or she might go 
to [a particular white-shoe firm] or [another particular white-shoe firm].192  
 
 
Indeed, one informant suggested that some at Jewish law firms saw it as their mission to 
hire discriminated-against, elite Jewish lawyers: “One outstanding example was [a 
particular Jewish law firm] [which] . . . made its business to hire Jews—particularly 
Orthodox Jews—that came from law schools and couldn't get jobs otherwise.”193 
       The existence of a large, talented pool of Jewish candidates, over- looked by the 
WASP firms and consequently available to work for the Jewish firms, was also 
confirmed by an informant recalling his job-hunting days: 
 
I already had the understanding that the firms I would be looking at would be the 
Jewish firms, and it was not because I was looking for the Jewish firms, but I was 
looking for a job, and whether right or wrong, I do not know—all I can give you is 
personal experience—there was a feeling that the white-shoe firms downtown . . . 
were not interested in Jews. I can't say that [from] firsthand testimony, [but] I do 
know [that] when I came to [a growing Jewish firm] they hired me . . . relatively 
quickly, [and] I concluded [that] this would be anecdotal . . . [to] whatever 
discrimination or alleged discrimination or the perception of discrimination that was 
occurring in these large firms. . . . We were getting, in my opinion, the cream of the 
crop, and when I say “cream of the crop,” let's face it, there were non-Jews that 
were cream of the crop too, but many Jews would feel the same [way] that I did and 
therefore immediately opt for a firm like [ours]. When I came to the firm . . . there 




       In conclusion, the Jewish firms benefited from near exclusive access to this talented 
pool of attorneys between the early 1950s and the mid 1960s, and to a lesser, yet still 
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significant, degree between the mid 1960s and the early 1980s—access that allowed them 
to grow at a pace faster than that of the WASP firms while recruiting and retaining top 
talent. 
       Curiously, and seemingly contrary to the basic logic of supply and demand, the pool 
of elite Jewish candidates throughout the 1950s and 1960s remained large, 
notwithstanding discrimination by the WASP firms and limited hiring by the growing, 
but still relatively small, Jewish firms. In other words, in spite of relatively weak demand 
for their services by discriminatory WASP firms and growing Jewish firms, the supply of 
talented Jewish lawyers graduating from elite law schools remained robust. The 
informants suggest a complex interplay of religious, cultural, and socio-economic 
considerations that drove many Jews to attend elite law schools in spite of grim hiring 
prospects. Some suggest the affinity between Judaism and Jewish studies and law. 195 One 
informant affirmed this affinity, stating: 
 
When I started . . . I was in tax law. There are, I think, a greater proportion of 
people with a religious studies background in tax law than in anything else, because 
I think there is a parallelism. . . . Tax has an affinity [with the Talmud in that] you 
are [dealing with] a multitude of layered interpretations.196 
 
 
       Others highlighted the commitment within the Jewish community to education: 
 
I became a lawyer just because I wanted more education. I didn't have any lawyers 
in my family. I didn't know any lawyers but I went to law school because I wanted 
more education and I didn't have a particular career path.197  
 
 
       Indeed, the connection between religious upbringing and education, on the one hand, 
and law, on the other, entailed a commitment not only to pursuing graduate education but 
to elite education, status, and credentials as building blocks for a future professional 
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career. An informant confirmed:  
 
From Ramaz [an orthodox Jewish school] I was admitted both to Columbia and to 
Harvard, and much to the disappointment of the people at Ramaz, I chose to go to 
Columbia. They would've liked me to go to Harvard, which says something about 
that. . . . I think I wanted to be a lawyer from the time I was ten years old. . . . There 
was no one in the family that I knew who was a lawyer . . .  I think I liked dealing 
with words and writing . . .  So . . . law seemed like an obvious extension of the 
kind of things that I was good at . . . . I could read fast, I could articulate well, and 
so forth. . . . The only diversion was the possibility of going to Yeshiva to 
Rabbinical School. . . . Then I considered seriously for career reasons maybe I'd 
rather be a rabbi than a lawyer. [I] decided that while I might like studying to be a 
rabbi, I would never like the work, [whereas] even if I didn't like studying [the] law, 
I was sure I was going to like [practicing law], from what I could see.198 
 
 
       Other informants describe a cultural background in which graduate school was an 
obvious extension of their upbringing, if not the only acceptable choice after college.199 
Particularly telling is the following account of an informant who describes his decision to 
attend law school as his only available option to avoid starvation: 
 
I went to law school because, like many children of rabbis, it's a form of rebellion to 
not go into your father's profession. I found [being a rabbi] to be a very difficult 
profession—great physical and psychological toll. . . . So, being a rabbi was not for 
me. I had no scientific skills. Also, many of my classmates were [studying to be 
doctors]; in those days, it was the biggest accomplishment to be a Jewish doctor. . . 
. So, I didn't want to compete in the world of doctors. It was hard enough to get into 
medical school for Jews at the time. There were so many who wanted to be doctors. 
So, I took up a little art education, having zero money, no capita l, [and] no abilities 
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to open a business because there were very few Jews in business, unless they were 
running their parents['] business. . . . I learned not to starve to death. The only thing 
that was available to me was to get a law degree.200 
 
 
While the informant's perception regarding law practice as a possible lucrative 
occupation was, as we have seen, somewhat mistaken, his reasoning is nonetheless 
revealing. He subjectively perceived his only career options as a rabbi, a doctor, a 
scientist, or an attorney. 
       Other informants identified a poor socio-economic background as the driving force 
behind attending law school; law school and a career as a lawyer represented not only a 
natural extension of an educational path, but also a ticket out of poverty.201 One 
informant said: 
 
Thompson Harris was a preparatory high school for city college and city college 
professors taught in the high school. If you wanted to be eligible to go to this high 
school, you had to pass an examination, and if you passed the exam, you obviously 
went. If you didn't pass, you went to the regular high schools. I was fortunate 
enough to go to Thompson Harris, which was a great educational experience. . . . 
[After WWII,] I finished at law school and then I got a fellowship at the Lo ndon 




Similarly, another informant recalled: 
 
[I] lived in Brooklyn for virtually all of my childhood in a two-family home. [I 
w]ent to [the] Horace Mann School [an elite prep school] [and] rode the subway for 
an hour and twenty minutes each day. . . . I remember in high school wanting to be 
a lawyer. I actually am one of those people that said that's what I'm going to be, and 
that was somewhere around the age of sixteen, so I never had any doubt.203  
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One informant revealed, “[My parents] were not highly educated people. I have two older 
brothers. I was very fortunate to be able to have a good education. The schools were quite 
helpful with the financial drain at that time.”204  
       The robust supply of elite Jewish lawyers was thus not as sensitive to weak demand 
and challenging job prospects because, for many Jewish men, the decision to attend an 
elite law school was more than a mere cost-benefit analysis. Rather, it was the product of 
their upbringing, which emphasized education and scholarly pursuits as important and 
desirable values, commitment to graduate education, a perception that the law was a 
worthy alternative to a religious career, and a sense of debt to parental sacrifices that 
demanded a scholarly and thoughtful career path. 205 The unique combination of effective 
discrimination against Jewish law students and attorneys by white-shoe firms and the 
commitment of Jewish students to enroll in elite law schools notwithstanding grim job 
prospects upon graduation thus resulted in the creation of a large ta lented pool of Jewish 
lawyers from which the growing Jewish firms recruited nearly exclusively. 
 
C. The Transformation of Professional Ideology and the Flip Side of Bias 206  
 
        
The decline of the old, prevailing large law firm professionalism paradigm and the rise of 
                                                                                                                                                 
Horace Mann in New York City. There were two brothers in one family, one in another and I and 
we were the only children from New Je rsey going to Horace Mann. So I went to school in New 
York. Most of my friends were from New York, but I still lived in New Jersey. The social scene 
was a little bit  strange for me (Informant #12, 2).  
 
204
 Informant #6, 1. 
205
 An upbringing committed to education and excellence as a means of pursuing the American Dream and 
socioeconomic mobility is, of course, not unique to Jews and is common among other minority groups. 
See, e.g., Amy Chua, Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother (New York: Penguin Press, 2011); Peter H. Huang, 
“Tiger Cub Strikes Back: Memories of an Ex-Child Prod igy about Legal Education and Parenting,” British 
Journal of American Legal Studies 1 (2012): 297–347, on upbringing and commitment to education among 
some Asian-American parents. 
206
 By the “flip side of bias,” I mean to denote the positive consequences of prejudice and contrast them 
with the usual negative outcomes of bias. See “An Interview with Jennifer Lee: What is Stereotype 
Promise?” http://www.russellsage.org/blog/interview-jennifer-lee-what-stereotype-promise (last visited 
July 10, 2013). 
the business paradigm, what Russell Pearce has called a “paradigm shift,”207 played an 
important, and unexpected, role in the growth of the Jewish firms. As a result of a gradual 
ideological paradigm shift at large law firms—the decline of white-shoe ethos, 
paternalistic collegiality and secrecy,208 and the rise of a more explicitly competitive 
business ideology emphasizing the financial bottom line, profits-per-partners, an eat-
what-you-kill ethos, and around the clock client service—the same prejudices, 
stereotypes, and bias that fueled and helped sustain effective discrimination against 
Jewish attorneys under the old ideology made Jewish attorneys and Jewish law firms 
desirable under the new model. That is, the paradigm shift in the underlying ideology of 
large law firms that replaced the prevailing white-shoe ethos with a more explicitly 
business-oriented notion of professionalism resulted in the “flip side o f bias”; namely, it 
rendered the loathed “qualities” of Jewish lawyers under the old model—wealth 
maximizing, manipulative on behalf of clients, and instrumentalism, not to say 
conniving—into positive attributes of lawyering under the new one. The very same 
stereotypes that fueled prejudice against Jewish lawyers and Jewish law firms were now 
perceived as desirable qualities.209  
       The informants’ accounts confirm that the “flip side of bias” was a general 
phenomenon operating outside of the legal profession. For example, one informant 
stated, “The medical corps did not qualify for combat service because the general I.Q. 
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was far below army standards. So, they took five Jewish kids from New York and put 
them in the medical corps so they could raise the general average so it became combat-
worthy.”210  
       Yet, they emphasize the interplay of the “flip side of bias” phenomenon with factors 
such as the possession of cultural and social capital, especially the notion of high 
intellectual self-esteem, in explaining their success.211 The same informant added: 
 
Probably, in the back of my mind, there was the expectation that I would attend law 
school at some point. But, since I couldn't afford it, it was a vague hope. But then I 
got the scholarship at Yale, and that permitted me to participate in Yale activities, 
and after that, I went into the army, and then the G.I. Bill came along and that 
provided me with adequate funds.212  
 
 
       Describing his experience at Harvard Law School one informant recalled a process 
of great intellectual growth, “I went to law school very unsophisticated and very ignorant. 
I did not know anything about law, about Harvard, or about much else related to the legal 
profession. But I was a pretty good soldier, and I went and did what I was supposed to 
do.”213 Within a year, however, “All sorts of things happened to me in my second year at 
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law school. I became much more sophisticated and ‘worldly.”’214 Tellingly, the informant 
never doubted his own capacity to grow so rapidly, to succeed, even excel at law school. 
Confident in his intellectual abilities, it was only a matter of time until he was to prove 
his talents. “I had been a young ‘hot shot’ student when I got out of law school.”215 
       Another informant explained his decision to attend law school as follows: “[I] 
probably [chose law school] because . . . I like to read; I like intellectual exercises, and 
actually the affinity between law and mathematics, although using very different types of 
ways of the intellectual exercise, the logical exercise[s] are very similar.”216 One 
informant explained that after graduating from law school he felt socially awkward. It 
was not merely that he self-selected out of interviewing with the large white-shoe firms 
because he thought they would not hire a Jew, or with the large Jewish firms because he 
thought they would not hire an Orthodox Jew. Rather, it was his perception that his lack 
of people skills would lead to failure in interviewing.217 But, the informant reasoned, this 
notion of social awkwardness explains why he, and possibly other Jews, was interested in 
law. Many Jews thought that the only obstacle they had to overcome was social 
awkwardness. They never doubted their own abilities otherwise. Law was an “obvious” 
choice because “once you overcome the social factor, your mental capacities are there 
and Jews are confident in their ability to exercise judgment.”218 Law schools, the 
informant concluded, “made it possible for Jews to play the game.”219  
       Indeed, high intellectual self-esteem played a role not only in the success of Jewish 
law students at elite law schools and of Jewish attorneys at large firms, but it also helps 
explain the growth and success of Jewish law firms. One informant explained that since 
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there was no legal authority for a position he wanted to take, “I wrote [an] article which 
provoked the debate. In a way sometimes it's very useful to have the entire academic 
world take the opposite position because there must be something to your position if 
everybody in the academic world argues against it.”220 The point is not merely that the 
informant's position subsequently became the law on the issue ; rather, it is that the 
informant, a practicing attorney, felt completely comfortable doing battle with leading 
scholars in the academic arena. 
       The informants highlighted the significance of familial and community support  in 
developing high intellectual self-esteem which, in turn, allowed them to benefit from the 
flip side of bias and reap the benefits of positive stereotyping. Describing the reaction of 
his family to his decision to attend law school, one informant noted, “Oh, [they were] 
very proud. To have a kid go to Yale was beyond their dreams. So, there was nothing but 
great support. Not that they could afford anything, but they . . . approved heartily. And 
you know, it worked out well for me afterwards.”221 Another reinforced the idea of strong 
cultural and familial support: 
 
I was fifteen . . . [and] the career paths, I think . . . probably would have been either 
the rabbinate or law. And just sort of looking around, I thought the law was the 
more socially promoting, reinforcing kind of position. . . . The family was certainly 
supportive of me. I think at the time that I started law school, my father was either 
changing businesses or whatever it was, and at that time I even got a partial stipend 
or scholarship from Columbia Law, because it was something of a financial 
difficulty. . . . I cannot remember what I would call a serious discussion or even 
dispute over a career choice.222 
 
 
       Finally, another informant noted the importance of an upbringing in a cultural 
commitment to education to the development of cultural capital, stating, “The opposition 
[to law school] was only to the extent that people didn't think that you should be pursuing 
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secular careers at all. Even in those days, there were rabbis that would have preferred that 
I would have stayed on.”223  
       The stereotype of Jewish attorneys as learned experts, now a desirable quality under 
the new more competitive professional paradigm, was, according to the informants, 
consistent with their actual backgrounds. Describing his hobbies and interests as a child, 
one informant recalled: 
 
If you mean before I was four and a half, there were no hobbies . . . [I was] taught 
to read, to ‘study,’ to pray, to carry out religious ritual and to count simple 
arithmetical  
operations . . . [growing up] I essentially had a five and a half day week; the day 
was from 8:45 to 6:30, Sunday through Thursday, and 9 to 12 Friday. 224  
 
 
       Education took clear precedent over work. The same informant remembered, 
“Mostly, there was no time to work, because we did not work on the Sabbath and on 
Sunday I was at school all day. There was no real opportunity to work.”225 Further, “I 
never learned to do things with my hands. I, too, did not learn to do anything menial until 
I went out on my own, and had to learn to wash dishes and make beds.”226 The account is 
revealing exactly because the informant hailed from a poor socio-economic background. 
Not learning to make his bed was not an indication of a privileged background, rather, it 
was a reflection of commitment and devotion to learning and the intellectual over the 
mundane. 
       Another explained that he grew up in a culture in which commitment to education 
was a foregone conclusion, and graduate school was a default choice when one did not 
know what to do after college. When asked why he went to law school, the informant 
responded: 
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I have no good answer for you. I'm not so sure that I knew what I was going to do 
as I went into my last year of college. I really had not pulled up my sleeves . . . But 
what happened was, I took the law school boards and I did very, very well. I can't 
say I stayed up nights, that I was going to save the world.227 
 
 
       Finally, commenting on the powerful interplay of commitment to education within 
the Jewish community and high intellectual self-esteem exhibited by Jewish lawyers, one 
informant jokingly noted: 
 
It seems you have to be an ordained rabbi now to get on the law review. But the 
reason why, is because we [observant Jews] actually, I think, have an edge. As 
people were getting used to abstract thinking, and for legal reasoning, this was 
something that we had all done for a very long time . . . the basis, so much of the 
basis of law and civil law, whether it's, you know, torts or property law, is derived 
from the Judaic system and the problem, I think, with the whole method of 
reasoning and thinking [is] that it is so familiar to us. And [since selection to law 
review is] based on your first year's performance, I frankly think we had an unfair 
advantage.228  
 
       The “flip side of bias” phenomenon helped build the Jewish law firm's reputation. 
Under the new business model of professionalism, the thin religious identity of the 
Jewish firm—the product of the religious identity of its lawyers—served as a selling 
point to its clients. “But it may reflect a tendency that I've heard said rightly or wrongly 
about the stereotype of Jewish lawyers that they're always pushing to get ahead,” said one 
informant. “If you're pushing to get ahead, you're focusing on what you need to get 
ahead.”229  
        While the Jewish firms never cultivated an explicitly Jewish culture of legal 
practice, their perceived religious identity, one which “flipped bias” rendered desirable, 
arguably made law firms with a majority of Jewish lawyers more attractive to entity 
clients and, ironically, enabled Jewish law firms to actually benefit from bias and 
prejudice. An informant confirmed this perceived identity, stating: 
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You have to understand that most of this is a perception . . . [It] is important to be 
seen by litigators because, how many people have ever seen me in court? That's 
how you get a reputation. You get a reputation by being seen with litigators. Just 






       The interplay of diminished religious-based discrimination and increased client 
demand for corporate legal services provides the backdrop for the incredible success 
story of the Jewish law firm in New York City. The chapter identifies several factors, 
however, that combined to help explain the emergence and unique growth of the Jewish 
firm: the rise of inside counsel as decision-makers within large corporate entities 
regarding the engagement of outside counsel replacing discriminating executives; the 
emergence of Jewish firms at a time when individual visibility of superstar attorneys was 
still feasible and played a significant role in the building of firm-wide reputations; and 
the existence of a Jewish client base consisting of a large number of smaller e ntities. All 
of these factors, operating in the shadow of diminished anti-Semitism and religious-based 
discrimination, enabled the growth of Jewish firms.  
       Moreover, the relatively small number and size of the old WASP firms; their refusal 
to compete with the Jewish firms over the provision of “undignified” legal services, such 
as real-estate, bankruptcy and hostile takeovers, resulting in the de facto crea tion of 
Jewish pockets of practice in which the Jewish firms could prove their expertise and from 
which they crossed over to more “dignified” practice areas; effective discriminatory 
hiring and promotion practices by the old WASP firms against Jewish attorneys, which 
created a pool of talented entry-level and lateral Jewish lawyers from which Jewish law 
firms could cherry-pick; and the “flip side of bias” phenomenon all explain the unique 
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growth of Jewish law firms at a rate far exceeding that of the WASP firms. 
       Current practice realities in New York City and throughout the United States have 
changed significantly.231 The informants suggest that Jewish lawyers presently face little 
to no systematic ethno-religious-based discrimination.232 For instance, one informant 
noted, “There's no suggestion of anti-Semitism at the bar in New York . . . [Outside of 
New York City,] I don't know. I wouldn't like to try a case in Texas. Not because I'm 
Jewish, but because you can get home-towned.”233 Another opined: “You sort of had no 
choice, even if at your heart you were racist. You had to understand that the economics of 
the business could no longer support your racism.”234 One informant noted the current 
level of religious tolerance and accommodation afforded to Jewish attorneys.235 
Moreover, to the extent it currently persists, religious discrimination reflects the opinions 
of the older generation within large firms. As one informant stated: 
 
I think that when you look at what we would call the very established white-shoe 
firms, in many of their firms there really is what might be described as the old firm 
and the new firm . . . I remember I had a case, I tried a case . . . and one of the 
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 Informant #15, 4-5. The informant further commented:  
I think that culturally this firm [an old white-shoe firm] has been a super-meritocracy because 
really we only care about one thing, which is, talent. And if you do a good job, then nothing else 
matters and, in fact, the courtesy [to observant Jewish attorneys] is pretty overwhelming . . . the 
whole thing has changed and the courtesy has been absolutely overwhelming . . . And I think it 
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important witnesses in that case was a member of the board, who was a [senior] 
partner [at an old white-shoe firm]. I think it's fair to say that he had not covered 
himself in the handling of this situation. And I mentioned [to another partner at that 
firm] that I'd had [contact] with this particular partner and the reaction was, “Well, 
you have to understand, he's part of the old firm, he's not part of the new firm.”236  
 
 
       Consequently, as old WASP firms hire and promote Jewish lawyers, and as Jewish 
firms hire and promote non-Jews, the Jewish firms, which never developed a distinctive 
professional Jewish culture, are losing their Jewish identity: 
 
Our law firm is hardly a Jewish law firm anymore . . . we have offices all over the 
world in Germany and [China] and . . . and you can be sure the people working for 
us in Germany and [China] aren't Jewish, they are whoever they are and whatever 
they are is fine. So the firm, our firm, has expanded into the pluralistic world. 237  
 
 
       That is, since the Jewish firms were Jewish only by discriminatory default, they 
gradually lose their Jewishness as they hire and promote non-Jews. An informant 
affirmed this fact, stating, “There were a number of non-Jewish, and today I would say it 
was a mixed firm. Largely, I don't know if it's fifty-fifty or two thirds/one third but very, 
very significant people in the firm are non-Jewish.”238 Similarly, a partner at a non-
Jewish firm described the composition of his firm as follows: “You know, the proportion 
now is probably, if I had to guess, I would say, a third to forty percent of the partners are 
Jewish, a third to forty percent [are] Catholic, and a third [are an]other [religious 
affiliation].”239 
       Indeed, contemporary practice realities in New York City nearly render the old 
divide among large law firms meaningless. One informant noted : 
 
My favorite story [is] about [a particular old WASP firm], where a [a Jewish 
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partner] I know, was head of the tax department. He and I were negotiating part of 
that deal that you see all bound in volumes. We had a whole group on the phone . . . 
He was trying to persuade me to do something in a different format. He says, “Look 
. . . you have to pay the tax [using a Yiddish phrase].” There was absolute silence, 
and I said, “Look guys, it's all right. I'll explain it to you.” But to me, that one 
telephone conference call represented how far we had come from 1960 to the year 
2000 . . . or . . . 1998. That year he was—and I was—we were both very 
comfortable, and could talk in that language. So, it was within a lifetime, it was a 
big step forward.240  
 
 
And another informant commented: 
 
Our [Jewish] firm has expanded into the pluralistic world and the white-shoe firms 
have expanded into the pluralistic world, and we had a very funny experience 
because, at one point, we were talking to [a particular old WASP firm] about doing 
an arrangement together and [the old WASP firm], which really used to be one of 
the white-shoe law firms, sent their executive committee over to meet with our 
executive committee. Their executive committee was all Jewish, our executive 
committee was all Christian, and we commented on the fact that the world had 
really changed. And it has, it has. This is really astonishing.241  
 
 
        As Jewish firms decline, has something of value been lost? The informants suggest 
that Jewish law firms were created because of discriminatory practice realities, and the 
decline of religious-based discrimination should lead to the decline of “Jewish” firms. 
One informant pointed out: 
 
From having dichotomized law firms, Jewish and un-Jewish . . . did you make a 
virtue out of a vice? The vice was anti-Semitism. The virtue was [that] there were 
some firms who took a few Jews. . . . The point is, it's like saying, “We'll put you in 
a concentration camp, but we'll be better, we'll give you bread . . . [and] put you out 
of the system.” So, somebody came to the rescue of a few people. There's no virtue; 
that's the point.242 
 
 
       Others echo the sentiment, suggesting that because Jewish law firms were Jewish 
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only by discriminatory default, such firms will disappear as Jewish attorneys become less 
and less religious.243 In fact, one informant stated: 
 
I tend to believe that Jewish lawyers compartmentalize their [Jewishness] from the 
standpoint of law—they're as hungry as everybody else. What is good for their 
education, what is good for their practice . . . ? Maybe it shows the narrowness in 
terms of Jewish lawyers. Don't misunderstand me, they may go to a lecture [about 
Judaism] . . . or something . . . [and] they'll jump in and what not, but as a regular 
course, it's a luxury.244  
 
 
The rise and growth of large Jewish law firms in the second half of the twentieth 
century is a remarkable success story of overcoming discrimination in the legal 
profession.  Paradoxically, part of the very success of the Jewish firms is reflected in their 
demise by the early twenty-first century: because systematic large law firm ethno-
religious discrimination against Jewish lawyers has become a thing of the past, the very 
reason for the existence of Jewish law firms has been nullified.  As other minority 
groups, however, continue to struggle for equality within the profession’s elite large law 
firms, can the experience of the Jewish firms serve as a “separate-but-equal” blueprint for 
overcoming contemporary forms of discrimination for women, racial, and ethnic minority 
attorneys?   
Perhaps not.  As this chapter establishes, the success of large Jewish law firms was 
the result of the coming together of numerous conditions and circumstances between 
1945 and 1980, from the general decline of ethno-religious discrimination in American 
society and increased demand for corporate legal services; to the unique structure of the 
market for elite corporate legal services including the relatively small number and size of 
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large firms, their anti-competitive conduct, including staying out of undignified practice 
areas such as real-estate hostile takeovers, bankruptcy and even litigation allowing 
Jewish firms to establish themselves in these pockets of practice and the cross over to 
more dignified legal arenas, WASP firms’ traditional and die-hard organizational habits 
and their discriminatory hiring and promotion practices; the rise of in-house counsel; the 
affinity of Jews to American law and the legal profession resulting in their flocking to 
law schools notwithstanding grim job prospects; and the flip side of bias phenomenon 
that has elevated the status and perception of Jewish lawyers as the dominant ideology of 
large law firms became more competitive and meritocratic. Such a unique combination of 
conditions and circumstances may never be replicated again. 
To be clear, some of these conditions apply to some minority lawyers, for example, 
Joan Williams has opined that women lawyers may benefit from the flip side of bias as 
in-house counsel departments increasingly value stereotypically feminine qualities such 
as cooperative styles of practice and being a team player.245  But other key conditions are 
absent, for example, large law firms have become hyper-competitive and are unlikely to 
allow any newcomers the benefit of protected pockets of practice.  As importantly, even 
if “separate-but-equal” styled law firms could succeed, the desirability of combating 
inequality by resorting to “separate-but-equal” institutions is likely to be a complex and 
controversial issue.  Jewish lawyers, after all, did not choose to practice in Jewish law 
firms, they were forced into them by explicitly discriminatory practice realities.  While 
implicit discrimination is still rampant in BigLaw, many minority lawyers today do have 
a choice to enter these institutions and some choose to do so hoping that equality can be 
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achieved by and from within large law firms rather than forced upon them by “separate-
but-equal” competitors.  Assuming other minority lawyers may choose to practice in 
“separate-but-equal” large law firms if such entities existed, would such institutions be 
desirable in a “post-gendered,” “post-racial” America?246 
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VIII. Appendix 
 
I interviewed twenty-two male Jewish lawyers who graduated from law school 
between 1945 and 1962, either joined a large New York City firm, WASP, Jewish, or 
mixed, or established their own, and practiced in New York City throughout their 
respective careers.247 I began by identifying a universe that consisted of the nineteen 
largest law firms in New York City in 1963,248 and excluded from the list one law firm 
that dissolved.249  
In particular, the study benefited from the assistance of two knowledgeable sources—
a New York City law professor who is an advisor to the Center for Jewish History in 
New York and a New York City law professor who is the director of a program in Jewish 
law and interdisciplinary studies. These informants were knowledgeable with respect to 
the experience of the Jewish lawyers who were the object of my inquiry and familiar with 
the history of New York City Jewish law firms. These sources were asked to review the 
list of large firms and suggest other New York City firms of which they were aware that 
were either a white-shoe firm, a Jewish law firm, or a mixed law firm. They confirmed 
that the list of large law firms included all the firms that are traditionally considered 
white-shoe firms. Based on their advice, I added to the list three law firms, two Jewish 
firms and one mixed firm, founded in the late 1960s, but after 1963. The final list of 
                                                 
247
 Lateral lawyer movement between 1945 and 1962 was uncommon. See Eli Wald, “Lawyer Mobility and 
Legal Ethics: Resolving the Tension between Confidentiality and Contemporary Lawyers' Career Paths,” 
Journal of the Legal Profession 31 (2007): 199. A majority of the interviewees jo ined a law firm and have 
practiced with it ever since. Some interviewees did leave their respective firms to assume public positions 
and returned to the firms thereafter.  
248
 Large New York City law firms experienced steady growth between 1945 and 1965. While the  internal 
ranking with in the largest nineteen firms changed, the list itself was stable. The firms in the init ial list were, 
in order of their size: Shearman & Sterling; White & Case; Cravath, Swaine & Moore; Dewey, Ballantine; 
Milbank, Tweed; Sullivan & Cromwell; Davis, Po lk; Simpson, Thatcher & Bart lett; Cahill, Gordon; Kaye, 
Scholer; Pau l, Weiss, Cleary, Gottlieb; Cadwalader; Donovan, Leisure; Rogers & Wells; Fried Frank; Weil 
Gotshal; Coudert Brothers; and Skadden, Arps. The largest law firm, Shearman & Sterling, had 134 
attorneys, and the smallest, Skadden, Arps, had ten attorneys. Remarkab ly, the same firms were the largest 
law firms in New York City in 1981, although the internal ranking within the list changed. See above, 
Table 2. 
249
 Coudert Brothers dissolved in 2005. See Ellen Rosen, “The Complicated End of an Ex-Law Firm,” N.Y. 
Times, Feb, 9, 2007, C7. 
firms consisted of twenty-one of the largest firms in New York City.  
My unit of analysis was the Jewish male lawyer who graduated from law school 
between 1945 and 1962 and was interested in joining a large New York City law firm.250 
My focus in the study was the attorney's interest and decision to apply to law school, his 
law school experience, his experience with the large law firm job market after law school, 
and his career path (for example, attempting to join a white-shoe firm as opposed to 
joining or founding a Jewish firm). I wanted to study the ways and the extent, if any, that 
ethnic and religious-based considerations played a role or were perceived to have played 
a role in the career of the attorney, and in his understanding and perception of the 
organization of the large firm. The purposive universe was limited to partners who have 
remained with their respective firms and thus experienced not only hiring and promotion 
with the firm, but also had the perspective of long tenure and the opportunity to observe 
changes in the firm’s employment practices, if any, over time.251 From December 2004 
through July 2005, I conducted twenty-two semi-structured interviews, which were all 
taped and transcribed verbatim. Page numbers in the informants’ citations in this chapter 
refer to the pages of the transcribed interviews. I spoke with twenty partners at fourteen 
large law firms. On three occasions, I interviewed more than one partner from a firm, 
and, thus, I was able to corroborate much of the information.252 I also spoke with two 
former partners at two additional law firms who currently hold public office. The 
respondents were told that their identity would be kept confidential.  
Within the list of law firms, I contacted respondents by snowball sampling. After 
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interviewing a partner, I asked him for a list of partners at other firms who would be the 
most knowledgeable about the experience of the cohort of Jewish lawyers I was studying. 
I contacted the referrals and continued the process. Snowball sampling can introduce bias 
into a study in that the sample firms and the respondents within the firms may not be 
representative of the universe, but rather of a selected group or network within a universe. 
These potential biases are always a concern. 
 In this case, I believe bias through snowball sampling is less of a concern. The 
purpose of the present chapter is not to generalize to a broad universe, but to explore 
ideas and perceptions about the growth of Jewish law firms in New York City. The 
qualitative interviews provided in-depth descriptions of the experiences of these lawyers 
and law firms. It is important to remember that the number of all large New York City 
law firms was small.253 Furthermore, within the list of law firms, the universe of study 
was restricted to Jewish male lawyers who graduated from law school between 1945 and 
1962 and were still practicing with their respective firms. Within that small universe, my 
sample was relatively large, consisting of twenty-two interviews and sixteen law firms.254  
Finally, in exploring the experience of Jewish male lawyers attempting to break into the 
large law firm sphere between 1945 and 1962, I was interested in the possibility of the 
existence of a network that possibly facilitated the effort. In any event, I contacted every 
candidate for interview identified by my snowball sampling.  
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